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This dissertation examines processes that induce conflict and order in the maritime 
areas adjacent to the Svalbard archipelago, where Norway’s sovereign rights as 
coastal state are contested. The first process is the ambiguous causal interplay of 
international politics and international law: After decades of debate, the parties to it 
remain reluctant to involve disinterested international third parties to settle their legal 
differences. Despite the legal character of the dispute, it endures as a political 
wrangle, as envisaged in a world of Realpolitik. Still, international law is not merely 
epiphenomenal to politics. International legal rules are cementing Norway’s right to 
establish and exercise jurisdiction in the zones, hence affecting international politics. 
The cementing effect of law on international relations goes beyond what was intended 
at the time of its adoption. The second process, the causal exchanges between the 
international system and a state’s foreign policy, is paradoxical: Norway, by its 
assertive exercise of jurisdiction and diplomatic efforts to muster international 
support, nourishes systemic conditions it in turn is constrained by. In effect, the 
policies of Norway cause changes in the international system that affect the policies 
of Norway. Attracting attention to the Svalbard issue has not improved Norway’s 
systemic conditions as aspired for, but rather spurred a more coordinated opposition 
against the claimed exclusive rights of Norway in the waters off of the former terra 
nullius. 
 


































The riches of the seas are sources of international conflict. Even in the 
remote Arctic region conflicts simmer over rights to utilize its natural 
resources. The Arctic, a treasury of fish, oil and gas,1 becomes 
increasingly attractive for exploiters as resources are depleted elsewhere: 
Fish stocks are exhausted worldwide as too many vessels chase too few 
fish,2 and the petroleum production bounds farther off shore as the most 
accessible reserves are drained, commodity prices soar and technology is 
innovated. Global warming and the melting of polar sea ice, making both 
renewable and non-renewable resources more accessible, give a further 
boost to the race for the riches of the Arctic region.3 
 
The right to exploit maritime resources such as fish stocks and 
hydrocarbons is regulated by international law, in custom or international 
agreement.4 Still, more often than not is the geographical extension of 
one state’s claimed rights disputed by another. Of a total of more than 
four hundred actual and potential boundaries between opposite and 
adjacent maritime zones of coastal states, less than half are settled.5 In 
addition come numerous disputes over the legal status of territories 
                                                
1 Donald Gautier, personal communication (e-mail), 10 May 2005. Also see United 
States Geological Survey Petroleum Assessment 2000. 
2 Olav Schram Stokke, "Introduction," in Governing High Seas Fisheries: The 
Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes, ed. Olav Schram Stokke (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 3. 
3 Scott G. Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of 
Global Warming," Foreign Affairs (2008). Also see Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13. 
4 Robin Churchill and Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999). 
5 David Anderson, "Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements: A Personal View," 
in Maritime Delimitation, ed. Rainer Lagoni and Daniel Vignes, Publications on 
Ocean Development (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006). 





generating such zones. States have a duty to seek a solution to their 
disputes by peaceful means.6 But even when diplomacy does not result in 
settlements, and notwithstanding that the disputes concern explicit rights 
under international law, adjudication is seldom sought by the parties to 
resolve their issues. Delegating authority to third parties is generally 
viewed as too costly to states, not least because it encroaches on their 
sovereignty.7 Hence, maritime legal disputes most often endure as 
political wrangles between actors of different interests and power 
capabilities. In a political world, the actual role of international law is 
ambiguous, and the politics-law relationship has been a natural subject 
for international relations research.8  
 
Sometimes rocking at the vital interests of states, conflicts over maritime 
claims may pose threats to peace and stability. Disputes over 
geographical claims have through history been a prelude for the use of 
military force and are, as one international lawyer observes, «akin to 
accidents waiting to happen».9 In the resourceful Arctic, some argue, 
armed conflict may already loom due to international debates about 
sovereign rights.10 Security concerns are thus likely to affect foreign 
policies toward contested waters. Since a state’s policies may lead to 
international repercussions, it usually consults its surroundings – the 
international system – before asserting its claims. Foreign policies are 
                                                
6 Charter of the United Nations, Article 33(1). Also see Part XV of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Seas (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3. 
7 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance," International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000). 
8 See Chapter 2. 
9 Anderson, "Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements: A Personal View," 121-
22. 
10 Caitlin Harrington, "Eyeing up the New Arctic: Competition in the Arctic Circle," 
Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 January 2008. 





made and remade in a broader systemic context, where the international 
system and the policies of each state are mutually forged. This 
relationship between the international system and each component unit – 
between external conditions and foreign policy – is another core 
undertaking for international relations researchers.11 
 
In one far end of the world, in the Antarctica, the perils that come with 
numerous incompatible national claims are temporarily eased by the 
Antarctic Treaty system, freezing all claims12 and placing a moratorium 
on commercial utility of minerals,13 although the depth of this 
cooperation has been brought in question.14 However this arrangement is 
an exception. In the other end of the world rage numerous disputes over 
delineation of maritime zones, but also over the status of polar territory. 
The Arctic features disputes between the United States and Canada over 
the legal status of the Northwest Passage and their boundary in the 
Beaufort Sea, between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island in the 
Nares Strait, between Norway and Russia over their maritime boundaries 
in the Barents Sea, as well as a boundary between Russia and the United 
States in the Bering Sea that still awaits Russian Duma ratification.15 
 
                                                
11 See Chapter 2. 
12 The Antarctic Treaty (opened for signature 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 
June 1961) 402 UNTS 71, Article IV. 
13 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (opened for signature 
24 April 1991, entered into force 14 February 1998) 30 ILM 1455. 
14 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News 
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" International Organization 50, 
no. 3 (1996): 389. 
15 Harrington, "Eyeing up the New Arctic: Competition in the Arctic Circle." 





Here lies also the archipelago of Svalbard, which status the international 
community sought to clarify by agreement in 1919-1920.16 Paradoxically, 
also the Svalbard Treaty (reproduced in Appendix I) has become a source 
of international debate over maritime rights in the Arctic.  
 
 
The case of Svalbard 
 
Norway obtained sovereignty over the former terra nullius in the Arctic 
region but was deprived of certain sovereign rights.17 The Svalbard 
Treaty forbid Norway to establish military bases and to use the Svalbard 
archipelago for «warlike purposes»,18 and it established that foreign 
nationals were to have the same commercial rights as Norwegians.19 
Moreover, Norway could not profit economically from its sovereignty 
since all taxed and duties levied there should be devoted exclusively to 
the archipelago.20 
 
The geographical extent of treaty restrictions has emerged as a matter of 
international discord. Norway holds that treaty stipulations do not apply 
to areas beyond the territorial sea of Svalbard. Others question or dispute 
Norway’s right to establish maritime zones adjacent to the archipelago, 
its right to exercise exclusive rights in such zones, and/or its right to 
                                                
16 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (adopted 9 February 1920, 
entered into force 14 August 1925) 2 LNTS 7 (hereinafter the Svalbard Treaty). 
17 Geir Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty 
(Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995). 
18 Svalbard Treaty, Article 9. 
19 Ibid., Articles 2 and 3. 
20 Ibid., Article 8. 





exercise legislative and enforcement jurisdiction there.21 The debates 
originate in the arguably vague references in the treaty to its applicable 
maritime areas («territorial waters»),22 made prior to the developments in 
the law of the sea that introduced legal concepts such as the continental 
shelf and the 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  
 
Suggesting that the maritime reference in the Svalbard Treaty also must 
include the continental shelf, the United Kingdom, for one, holds that its 
nationals have rights equal to those of Norwegians to exploit petroleum 
resources beyond the territorial sea of Svalbard. For the same reason, 
London implies that Norway has a limited right to levy taxes on such 
offshore industry.23 Others, most notably Russia, Spain and Iceland, have 
suggested that the explicit geographical reference to «territorial waters» 
restricts Norway’s authority to within the territorial seas of the 
archipelago. In maritime areas beyond the territorial limits, they assert, 
jurisdiction rests with the flag state rather than with the coastal state.24 
Yet others, including the United States, France and Germany, have 
reserved any rights they may have under the Svalbard Treaty outside the 
archipelago, thus keeping the legal question under review.25 
 
The international controversy over the legal status of these maritime 
zones is a major concern to Norway, its parliament Stortinget identifying 
                                                
21 Torbjørn Pedersen and Tore Henriksen, "Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of 
Legal Uncertainty?" submitted. (Chapter 5) 
22 Svalbard Treaty, Articles 2 and 3. 
23 Positions are explored in Torbjørn Pedersen, "The Dynamics of Svalbard 
Diplomacy," Diplomacy & Statecraft 19, no. 2 (2008). (Chapter 7) 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. Also see Clive Archer and David Scrivener, "Frozen Frontiers and Resource 
Wrangles: Conflict and Cooperation in Northern Waters," International Affairs 59, 
no. 1 (1982-83), Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995, vol. 6, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk 
Historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997). 





it as a challenge to peace and stability in the region.26 The disputes that 
surfaced around 1970 over jurisdiction and sovereign rights on the 
continental shelf around the archipelago remain unresolved, leaving it an 
enduring case of international tension.27 The management regime for the 
offshore areas adjacent to Svalbard has developed into something 
different from the regimes for uncontested maritime zones, such as the 
200 nm EEZ off of mainland Norway. But, amid international conflict, 




Map 1. Svalbard and adjacent maritime zones claimed by Norway.  
(Map courtesy of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) 
                                                
26 Recommendation No. 264 (2004-2005) to Stortinget from the Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs concerning opportunities and challenges in the High North. 
27 The first formal protest against Norway was a memorandum handed over by the 
Soviet Union on 27 August 1970. See Chapter 7. 
28 Geir Hønneland, Barentsbrytninger. Norsk Nordområdepolitikk Etter Den kalde 
krigen (Kristiansand S.: Høyskoleforlaget, 2005), Alf Håkon Hoel, "Det folkerettslige 
rammeverket for ressursforvaltningen i Barentshavet," Ottar, no. 260 (2006). 





Purpose of Research 
 
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to explore two processes that 
induce conflict and order in the areas offshore Svalbard. The first process 
is the causal interaction of international politics and international law 
(Figure 1.1). It will be argued that each of these two factors constrains the 
other, and that the exchange of political and legal constraints indeed 
induces conflict and order in the maritime areas around Svalbard. The 
second process is the causal exchanges between the international system 
and foreign policy (Figure 1.2). While the international system points to 
an analytical level that examines the interaction of multiple units, policy 
is referred to on a unit level of analysis. Again the dynamics between two 
factors – system and policy – will account for conflict and order outside 
Svalbard.  
 
Figure 1. Causal links between (1) politics and international law, and  
(2) the international system and foreign policy. 
 
Four case-specific questions are raised to explore the mechanisms of 
these processes. Two of these relate to the interaction of international 
politics and international law: 
 
• How (if at all) does politics in the Svalbard offshore areas affect 
the outlook for a legal settlement of disputes? 





• How (if at all) do legal rules for determining continental shelf 
limits affect politics toward the Svalbard offshore areas? 
 
The other two questions address the relationship between the 
international system and foreign policy: 
 
• How (if at all) does the international system affect the policies of 
Norway toward the Svalbard offshore areas? 
• How (if at all) do the policies of Norway toward the Svalbard 
offshore areas affect the international system? 
 
While the two processes (politics–law and system–policy) are 
explanatory, each of the four factors (politics, law, system and policy) 
may be both cause and effect. Conflict and order off of Svalbard is an 
outcome, the processes are considered independent variables, while the 
individual factors are both dependent and independent.  
 
Summarized, the overall research purpose is to explore two processes 
(politics–law and system–policy) that affect the maritime areas outside 
Svalbard, while the research questions address relationships between 
factors, notably how politics affects law, how law affects politics, how 
system affects policy, and how policy affects system.  
 
To limit the scope of the dissertation, the politics-law and system-policy 
processes are kept separate in the following analysis. An examination of 
the interaction between these two processes, drawing causal connections 
between all four factors, would involve multiple and complex causal 
relationships. Indeed, some alternative links have been pointed out or 





explored by others, but a thorough examination of these would be a too 
grand undertaking for this dissertation: For instance, international 
politics, a component of the first process, have apparent links to the 
system-policy process. International politics, determined by interests and 
power, is essential to the systemic explanations of structural realists, to 
whom law plays a marginal or irrelevant role. Kenneth Waltz contrasts 
international politics to foreign policy rather than law, suggesting that the 
systemic level addresses politics and that the unit-level addresses 
policy.29 Anne-Marie Slaughter asserts that international politics and 
international law, the two components of the first process, «comprise the 
rules and reality» of the international system,30 a component of the 
second process. At the same time the other component – policy – is 
arguably determined by both politics and law. Furthermore, causes for 
compliance with international law may be found both at the system and 
policy levels of analysis. Beth Simmons finds compliance to be explained 
on the former level. She suggests that, to one state, «the behavior of other 
countries, especially in one’s own region, has far more influence on 
commitment and compliance [with international law] than has generally 
been recognized».31  Others stress causes on the level of domestic 
structure rather than systemic level, for instance by highlighting the 
                                                
29 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959), ———, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 
———, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," 
in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), ———, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," 
Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996). 
30 Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States," European 
Journal of International law 6 (1995). 
31 Beth A. Simmons, "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and 
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," American Political Science Review 
94, no. 4 (2000): 832. 





influence of domestic courts.32 The so-called New Haven School couples 
international law with foreign policy decision-making, approaching what 
they have called a «policy-oriented jurisprudence»,33 thus linking factors 
that are analyzed separate by this dissertation. A further investigation into 
these alternative causal connections would add more confusion than 
clarity to this dissertation. Hereinafter, politics is primarily related to law, 
and system is likewise primarily related to policy. 
 
 
1.2. Definitions and structure 
 
Definitions and case literature 
 
As already indicated the concepts of international politics, international 
law, international system and foreign policy are, as most political 
activities and structures, notoriously difficult to define. When contrasted 
to law, international politics relates to the language of Realpolitik, or 
dimensions with low degree of legalization.34 Primary determinants for 
political behavior are widely considered to be interest and power. 
Accordingly, international politics takes on a narrower meaning when 
contrasted with law than when making general references to international 
relations.  
                                                
32 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law, International 
Relations and Compliance," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London-Thousand Oaks-New 
Dehli: Sage, 2005; reprint, 2005). 
33 Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert D. Vander Lugt, eds., 
International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 110. 
34 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., "The Concept of Legalization," International 
Organization 53, no. 3 (2000). 





International law, on the other hand, is the body of legal rules, norms and 
standards that apply between states and other entities that are legally 
recognized as international actors,35 i.e., dimensions with high degree of 
legalization.36 The former is often associated with Hobbesian utilitarian 
relations among states, while the latter may suggest an orderly world as 
advertised for by liberals such as Immanuel Kant.37 Notwithstanding, as 
has been noted by others, «politics continues (albeit in different forms) 
even where there is law».38 
 
Among the scholars who have examined the dispute over rights in the 
maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard, many have stressed the impact of 
political factors.39 Commonly, they emphasize great power interests in 
the area due to its geographical proximity to the preponderance of 
Russia’s military-strategic capabilities in northwestern Russia. Indeed, 
the waters around Svalbard separate the naval bases of the Russian 
Northern Fleet from its most important areas of operation. Also, the 
shortest air route between the Russian and American territories is across 
the Arctic basin. While Russian strategists worry as Svalbard chokes 
                                                
35 International law is here defined as a body of rules instead of a process of 
authoritative decision-making, as has consistently been done by for instance the New 
Haven School. See e.g. Harold Hongju Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?" The Yale Law Journal 106 (1997). 
36 Abbott et al., "The Concept of Legalization." 
37 Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?" 
38 Abbott et al., "The Concept of Legalization," 404. 
39 Willy Østreng, Det politiske Svalbard (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1975), ——
—, Økonomi Og politisk suverenitet: Interessespillet om Svalbards politiske status 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974). Kristian Åtland, "Barentshavet som 
sikkerhetspolitisk arena: Fra frontsone til fredssone?," Ottar, no. 260 (2006), Jørgen 
Holten Jørgensen, "Svalbard og fiskevernsonen: Russiske persepsjoner etter Den 
kalde krigen," in FNI Report (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2003), Kristian Åtland, 
"Svalbard og russisk sikkerhetstekning," FFI-fokus, no. 1 (2004). 





Russia’s outlets to its deployments areas,40 others find for the same 
reason the Barents Sea to be ideal for strategic defensive purposes. 
Several states’ vital interests are thus at stake in the area.41 
 
Other scholars again have dealt with research questions almost 
exclusively within the realm of international law, including Robin 
Churchill, Geir Ulfstein, Carl August Fleischer, A. N. Vylegzhanin and 
V. K. Zilanov.42 The relationship between politics and law in general will 
be discussed in the next chapter, while the impact of these factors on the 
maritime areas around Svalbard is discussed in later chapters. 
 
Analytical levels are conceptualized differently. Still, while David Singer 
suggests two levels of analysis (state and system),43 Kenneth Waltz three 
(individual, state-unit and system),44 K. J. Holsti four (individual, state, 
                                                
40 The geographical importance of the Svalbard «strait» has been stressed by Russia. 
See for instance, Trygve Lie, Hjemover (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1958). 
41 See for instance Kjetil Skogrand and Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt: Atombomben, 
Norge og verden (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 2001), Jacob Børresen, "USA-marinens 
operasjoner i Nord-Atlanteren og Norskehavet," in NUPI-rapport (NUPI, 1985), Rolf 
Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 
1991), William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New 
York: Random House, 1986), Archer and Scrivener, "Frozen Frontiers and Resource 
Wrangles: Conflict and Cooperation in Northern Waters.", Olav Riste and Arnfinn 
Moland, «Strengt hemmelig»: Norsk etterretningstjeneste 1945-1970 (Oslo: 
Universitetetsforlaget, 1997). 
42 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Marine Management in Disputed Areas. The 
Case of the Barents Sea (London: Routledge, 1992), Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty: 
From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty, Carl August Fleischer, 
"Svalbardtraktaten: En utredning hvor også nye styreformer på Svalbard vurderes,"  
(1997), ———, "Svalbards folkerettslige stilling," in Norges havretts- Og 
ressurspolitikk, ed. Arne Treholt, et al. (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1976), A. N. 
Vylegzhanin and V. K. Zilanov, Spitsbergen: Legal Regime of Adjacent Maritime 
Areas, trans. William E. Butler (Eleven International Publishing, 2007), Carl August 
Fleischer, Petroleumsrett (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), ———, Folkerett (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1988). 
43 J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World 
Politics 14, no. 1 (1961). 
44 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, ———, Man, the State and War. 





system and global),45 and Greg Cashman five (individual, small-group, 
nation-state, interaction and international),46 most scholars distinguish 
between the level that addresses the policy of one unit and the macro 
level or levels that address the interaction of multiple units. 
 
The international system is generally approached in two ways. The first 
emphasizes its structure, determined by the distribution of power 
capabilities among its units.47  However, this is a challenging approach. 
The vague concept of power is appropriately described as «one of the 
most troublesome in the field of international relations».48 While some 
scholars emphasize military might,49 or primarily naval power,50 others 
underline economic capabilities reflected in the Gross Domestic 
Product,51 or demography.52 Yet others highlight geography as a power 
factor.53 Bueno de Mesquita’s «expected utility» is a composite 
measurement of capabilities adjusted for distance, alliance relationships 
                                                
45 Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 6. 
46 Greg Cashman, What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International 
Conflict (New York: Lexington Books, 1993), 13. 
47 Some refers to the international system when really addressing its structure. 
Kenneth Waltz, whose focus is on structure, does not refer to systemic interaction as a 
level of analysis but as international politics. See Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics, ———, Man, the State and War, ———, "International Politics Is Not 
Foreign Policy." 
48 Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 13. 
49 See e.g. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 
International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-1995). 
50 George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 20, no. 2 (1978). 
51 See e.g. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), 
358. 
52 David A. Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in Handbook of 
International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2005 [2002]; reprint, 2005), 181. 
53 See e.g. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 7 ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 122-24. 





and uncertainty.54 Kenneth Waltz notes that «an agent is powerful to the 
extent that he affects others more than they affect him».55 Arguably, by 
most definitions, actually measuring power is a difficult if not impossible 
undertaking. 
 
A second approach therefore considers the international system to be the 
interaction of multiple units. Even power structures are reducible to the 
properties of units.56 The system may thus be analyzed as the component 
units interact, for instance in terms of diplomatic communication, trade, 
rivalries and warfare.57  
 
Foreign policy is «the sum of official external relations conducted by an 
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations»,58 that is, on 
a unit-level of analysis. In the foreign policy analyses relating to the 
Svalbard offshore areas, Norway for natural reasons is a primary – but 
not the only – target for analysis. The regime for the disputed maritime 
areas adjacent to the archipelago is established and managed by Norway.  
 
The analyses of the Salbard disputes by Willy Østreng, Ynge Næss 
Kristiansen and Kristian Åtland are predominantly made on an interaction 
level.59 Studies by Kristin Ven Bruusgaard and Tor Håkon Inderberg may 
                                                
54 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981), 151. 
55 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 192. 
56 Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987). 
57 K. J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 6 ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1992), 16-17. 
58 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
59 Åtland, "Barentshavet som sikkerhetspolitisk arena: Fra frontsone til fredssone?", 
———, "Svalbard og russisk sikkerhetstekning.", Østreng, Det politiske Svalbard, —





serve as examples on foreign policy analyses related to the Svalbard 
case.60 Some explicitly looks at both levels of analysis. In his study of the 
policies of the territory of Svalbard, Arild Moe notes that Norway’s 
policies toward the area are constrained by external conditions, but he 
suggests simultaneously that Norway also may influence its foreign 
policy conditions.61  
 
Svalbard waters and the Svalbard offshore areas refer to maritime zones 
beyond the territorial sea of the archipelago, i.e., the continental shelf as 
well as the 200 nm zone as defined by the law of the sea (see maps in 
Appendix III and IV).62 Historically, Norway has indicated that the shelf 
and the 200 nm zone outside Svalbard are generated by different 
territories,63 in effect denoting that if the Svalbard Treaty were applicable 
to one zone (the 200 nm zone generated by the archipelago) it would not 
necessarily be applicable to the other (the shelf generated by the 
Norwegian mainland). However, this position seems currently to be 
downplayed or abandoned.64 While the continental shelf and the 200 nm 
zone are different legal concepts, and parts of this dissertation focuses 
                                                
——, Økonomi og politisk suverenitet: Interessespillet om Svalbards politiske status, 
Yngve Næss Kristensen, "Torsk, "pirater" og kalde granater: Striden mellom Norge 
og Island om fiskevernsonen ved Svalbard 1993," in IFS Info (Institutt for 
forsvarsstudier, 2005). Also see Jørgen Holten Jørgensen, "Svalbard: Russiske 
persepsjoner og politikkutforming," Internasjonal Politikk 62, no. 2 (2004). 
60 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, "Fiskerikonflikter i Barentshavet - Potensial for 
eskalering? En komparativ studie av russiske reaksjonsmønstre under oppbringelsen 
av "Tsjernigov" (2001) og "Elektron" (2005),"  (Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, 2006), Tor Håkon Inderberg, "Den utenrikspolitiske håndteringen av 
Elektronsaken: Kompetent realpolitikk eller kompetansestrid?" FNI Rapport 3 (2007). 
61 Arild Moe, "Utenrikspolitiske rammebetingelser og norsk Svalbard-politikk," in 
Studie (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen-stiftelsen på Polhøgda, 1983). 
62 Notably, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3. 
63 Chapter 5. 
64 See discussion in ibid. 





primarily on the continental shelf, they are closely interrelated: The zones 
have the same legal foundation, and contentions over sovereign rights in 
one zone would apply equally, mutatis mutandis, to the other. As noted 
by the United Kingdom, an acceptance of Norway’s claims to exclusive 
fishing rights in the 200 nm Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around 
Svalbard may prevent it from maintaining its legal position over the 
continental shelf. «The shelf and waters cannot therefore be considered 
totally separate,» concludes the Foreign & Commonwealth Office in a 
diplomatic non-paper.65 Thus, for most practical purposes, the maritime 
zones beyond the territorial seas of Svalbard, and the controversies over 
rights on the shelf and in the 200 nm zone, may be viewed as inseparable. 
 
International law distinguishes between situation and dispute. A situation 
«might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute».66 The 
definition of dispute has been developed through case law as «a 
disagreement over a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of 
interest between two persons».67 All states have a duty to seek a solution 
to any dispute by peaceful means, since its continuance, as noted by the 
United Nations Charter, «is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security».68 
 
                                                
65 United Kingdom, Non-Paper on Svalbard to Norway, 5 January 1993. 
66 Charter of the United Nations, Article 34. 
67 See for instance the Nuclear Test Case (Australia, New Zealand v France) [1974] 
ICJ Rep 253, and the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction)(Greece v 
United Kingdom) case [1924] PCIJ Series A, No 2. Also see discussion in Malcolm 
N. Shaw, International Law, 3 ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991; 
reprint, 1995), 629. 
68 Charter of the United Nations, Article 33(1). Also see the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Seas, Part XV. 





By addressing the politics-law and system-policy processes the 
dissertation implies that there are two-way dynamics between 
international politics and law on one hand, and between the international 
system and foreign policy on the other. Accordingly, all factors – politics, 
law, system and policy – are presumed to be simultaneously causes and 
effects. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have traditionally 
concentrated on one-directional causal links. Within the realist tradition 
of international relations theory is has been more conventional to point to 
the constraining impact of politics on law than the other way around, as it 
has been more customary to address the impact of the international 
system (as a constraint) on foreign policy than the reverse.  
 
 
Structure of the dissertation 
 
The remainder of Chapter 1 will identify the main actors of the maritime 
dispute around Svalbard. It finds sovereign states to be the primary 
subjects, as in international law in general. However other actors are also 
identified, including autonomous provinces, international institutions and 
corporations. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses theoretical aspects of the two processes in question. 
First, it examines theories and thoughts on causal links between 
international politics and law. It examines the enduring literature 
depicting law as a mere effect of politics, with law reflecting order rather 
than creating it, and with compliance explained by coercion or self-
interest. But it also explores the massive literature suggesting that law – 
or related concepts such as institutions, regimes and norms – has 





considerable effect on outcome, either directly by guiding behavior or 
indirectly by shaping and forming political factors, as defined above. 
Second, it probes the links between the international system and the 
foreign policy of its units. A common notion is that the system constrains 
the behavior of each unit, primarily due to its structure. Foreign policies 
change with structural changes, as relative power is redistributed. 
However others point to the reverse causal link: Foreign policy sets off 
chain reactions that in turn make up the systemic conditions. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the methods used for answering the research questions 
that have been raised by this dissertation. It discusses methods for 
obtaining primary evidence relating to the research questions and for 
piecing together evidence from different sources of evidence in a case-
study analysis. The chapter discusses the validity and reliability of an 
analysis based on multiple sources of primary evidence, and points to 
some methodological challenges arising when addressing issues that are 
internationally sensitive and explains how these have been overcome. 
The primary sources of evidence probed are documents, archival records, 
interviews, observation and artifacts.69  
 
The results of the dissertation appear primarily in four studies, which are 
also published in, accepted by or submitted to peer-reviewed international 
journals.70 All the studies are reproduced in extenso as Chapters 4-7. Each 
study explicitly relates to one causal link between the factors in question. 
                                                
69 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, 3 ed. (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 2003). 
70 Torbjørn Pedersen, "The Svalbard Continental Shelf - Legal Disputes and Political 
Rivalries," Ocean Development and International Law 37, no. 3-4 (2006) (Chapter 4); 
Chapter 5; Torbjørn Pedersen, "The Constrained Politics of the Svalbard Offshore 
Area," Marine Policy, in press (2008) (Chapter 6); and Chapter 7. 





Chapters 4 and 5 address the interplay of the factors in the first process 
(international politics and law). Chapter 4 attends to how international 
politics in the Svalbard offshore area affects the outlook for a dispute 
settlement as advised by international law. Chapter 5 examines how legal 
rules for determining the outer limits of the continental shelf affect 
international politics in the area. The other two chapters, 6 and 7, relate to 
the second process (international system and foreign policy). Chapter 6 
asks how the international system affects the policies of Norway toward 
the maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard, while Chapter 7 inquires how the 
policies of Norway toward the area affect the international system. 
 
Chapter 8 addresses the overall research purpose and the four research 
questions that have been asked. The results from Chapters 4-7 are 
interpreted, analyzed and discussed in context of the research questions 
and the causal relations examined in Chapter 2. Each of the studies from 
Chapters 4-7 will be linked to one research question as well as one of the 
processes that are the subjects of this dissertation. The discussion will 
examine the interdependence between politics–law on one hand and 
between system–policy on the other, and point to some ambiguity and 
paradoxes embedded in the processes. In its concluding remarks, the 
chapter provides bearings on conflict and order developments based on 
the processes that are examined. 
 
 
1.3. Primary actors 
 
The Svalbard offshore controversy that is addressed by this dissertation 
constitutes an international dispute, in the sense that it is «a disagreement 





over a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests» 
between two or more states. It is a contention over rights that are held by 
states, such as sovereign rights to resources and the entitlement to claim 
zones and exercise coastal state jurisdiction.71 As in international law in 
general, the primary subjects of the Svalbard offshore controversy are 
accordingly sovereign states. Although foreign nationals hold extensive 
rights under the Svalbard Treaty, only sovereign states may be 
contracting parties to it (see list in Appendix II). Evidently states are the 
most dominant actors in the Svalbard offshore dispute.72 Some states, 
including the United States,73 France74 and (West) Germany75, have 
reserved the rights they may have under the Svalbard Treaty in maritime 
areas around Svalbard. Others, notably the United Kingdom76 and the 
Netherlands77, explicitly argue that the Treaty is applicable to maritime 
zones generated by the archipelago while recognizing Norway’s 
jurisdictional rights as coastal state in these zones. Others again, notably 
the Soviet Union/Russia78, Spain79, Iceland80, Hungary81, Poland82 and 
Czechoslovakia83, have historically challenged Norway’s right to exercise 
national jurisdiction in maritime areas outside Svalbard. Finland84 and 
                                                
71 Chapter 5. 
72 For an extended overview, see Chapter 7. 
73 USA, Note No. 20 to Norway, 20 November 1976. 
74 France, Note to Norway, 2 August 1977. 
75 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995. 
76 For instance, United Kingdom, aide memoire to Norway, 14 October 1986. 
77 Netherlands, Note No. 2238 to Norway, 3 August 1977. 
78 For instance, Russia, Note 3695/2ED to Norway, 23 April 2001. 
79 For instance, Spain, Note Núm. 56/18 to Norway, 30 July 1986. 
80 For instance, Iceland, Note (tilvísum UTN 00030094/47.F.002) to Norway 22 
September 2000. 
81 Hungary, Note No. J-198/1/1977 to Norway, 3 August 1977. 
82 Poland, Note to Norway, 6 July 1977. 
83 Czechoslovakia, Note No. 99.249/77 to Norway, 28 July 1978. 
84 Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995. The endorsement was withdrawn in 2005, see 
Chapter 7. 





Canada85, on the other hand, have earlier expressed support for the 
Norwegian view. 
 
While states are the most dominant actors, autonomous provinces 
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands are also identified as independent 
actors in the Svalbard offshore controversy. Although the Danish 
government is responsible for the foreign and security interests of these 
provinces,86 their respective Home Rule governments have expressed de 
facto foreign policies toward the Svalbard offshore areas either via the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark,87 or in bilateral fisheries 
negotiations with Norway.88 Also the European Union, notably the 
Commission, has been identified as an independent actor (although 
marginal) in the controversy without being a contracting party to the 
Svalbard Treaty.89  
 
While the Arctic has seen a proliferation in regional cooperation over the 
last 15 years, with the emergence of at least eight international forums 
including the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and 
Northern Forum as well as at least 13 different environmental 
                                                
85 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Government of Canada on Fisheries conservation and enforcement, preamble. In 
Proposition No. 3 (1995-96) to the Odelsting, 11. The agreement has not entered into 
force. 
86 The Foreign Ministry of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 4 May 2006 
<http://www.um.dk/en/menu/ForeignPolicy/GreenlandAndTheFaroeIslands/> 
accessed 2 December 2007. 
87 E.g. Demark, diplomatic note No. 63.D.3 handed to Norway on behalf of the 
Greenlandic Home Rule on 8 August 1986.  
88 For instance, ‘Protokoll fra drøftelser mellom færøyske og norske myndigheter i 
Oslo 9-10. desember 1997 om gjensidige fiskerettigheter I 1998’, Appendix 3. Also 
‘Protokoll fra drøftelser mellom færøyske og norske myndigheter I Tórshavn 7.-8. 
desember 1996 om gjensidige fiskerettigheter I 2007’, Appendix 3.  
89 For instance, the European Commission, note verbale to Norway, 20 July 2004. 





cooperation processes,90 these new structures have little relevance for 
disputes over rights in maritime zones, including the areas off of 
Svalbard. Indeed scholars and others did anticipate a new order for the 
Arctic region, governed by strong international regimes after the Cold 
War,91 partly on the back of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
famed Arctic «zone of peace» speech in Murmansk in 1987.92 Most 
excitement related to the Arctic Council, which was to be molded after 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and was 
to incorporate already existing agreements and treaties of the region.93 
However the Council will not be addressed as an independent or relevant 
actor: When established after two delays,94 it appeared more as an arena 
for debate than an international institution.95 Euphoria over a new Arctic 
order has faded, and the Council is a «normal», informal cooperation 
among states and is still viewed by the United States as a «forum».96  
 
Like the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council does not 
address jurisdictional issues or other issues that are related to the subject 
                                                
90 NOU 2003:32 Report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 8 
December 2003. 
91 See for instance Oran R. Young, Arctic Politics. Conflict and Cooperation in the 
Circumpolar North (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992). 
92 Mikhail Gorbachev, speech at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the 
Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk, 
Murmansk 1 October 1987 
<http://barents.ulapland.fi/photos/archive/Gorbachev_speech.pdf> accessed 1 
February 2008. 
93 Young, Arctic Politics. Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North. 
94 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 September 1996. 
95 Ibid. 
96 United States Department of State <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/arc/ac/> 
accessed 28 November 2007. The information posted here is a reproduction of Evan 
T. Bloom, "Establishment of the Arctic Council," The American Journal of 
International Law 93, no. 3 (1999).  





for this dissertation,97 although one of its goals is to «secure a peaceful 
and stable development in the Region».98 None of its working groups 
relate to security, legal or jurisdictional issues or in other ways to the 
research problem here.99  
 
The independent role of international institutions established by 
international law, that is, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), is discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
A small number of non-governmental actors have also been found to be 
involved in the international controversies off of Svalbard. Notably, 
Spanish ship-owners and trawler captains have contended the Norwegian 
management regime through the Norwegian judicial system all the way to 
the Supreme Court, and Russian joint-stock company Marine Arctic 
Geological Exploration (MAGE)100 has implicitly challenged the 
Norwegian authority through apparent petroleum exploration on the 
continental shelf adjacent to Svalbard.101 The latter was however an act 
on behalf of the Russian state represented by the Ministry of Natural 
Resources.102 In general, foreign private actors comply with the 
                                                
97 The cooperation was to be a meeting-place rather than a closely defined program 
for cooperation. See Johan Jørgen Holst, "The Barents Cooperation: Institutions, 
Cooperation and Prospects," in The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe, 
ed. Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander (London: Sage Publications, 1994). 
98 Protocol Agreement from the Statutory Meeting of the Regional Council of the 
Barents Region (The Euro-Arctic Region), Article 3. Kirkenes, 11 January 1993. 
99 The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Barents working groups and activities (undated), 
<http://www.beac.st/default.asp?id=131> accessed 28 November 2007. 
100 Marine Arctic Geological Exploration, homepage (undated). 
<http://www.mage.ru/fse.html> accessed 31 January 2008.  
101 Chapter 4. 
102 Ibid. 





Norwegian management regime,103 unless encouraged by their respective 
governments to do otherwise.104 
 
In sum, the main actors identified are collective social entities, most 
notably states, rather than individuals, although strictly speaking only 
individuals act.105 The politics–law process addressed by this dissertation 
relates to how some contrasted factors (politics and law) impact on these 
entities and their relations. The system–policy process on the other hand 
concerns the interplay between analytical levels: The international system 
is the interaction of the main actors, while foreign policy is the actions of 
one actor. 
                                                
103 Hønneland, Barentsbrytninger: Norsk nordområdepolitikk etter Den kalde krigen, 
85-88, Hoel, "Det folkerettslige rammeverket for ressursforvaltningen i 
Barentshavet." 
104 During the stand-down between Norwegian Coast Guard and Spanish trawlers in 
the mid-1980s Spain’s government had invited its fishers to proceed with their 
activity in the 200 nm zone around Svalbard despite Norwegian instructions to leave. 
Currently Russian trawlers fail to comply with Norwegian satellite tracking 
requirements in the fisheries protection zone due to Russian governmental policies. 
105 Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). 
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The overall study will examine processes that induce conflict and order in 
the maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard. The four research questions 
raised in the introduction call for a study of causal links, notably between 
international politics and international law, and between the international 
system and one state’s foreign policy. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present and contrast scholarly thoughts from the extensive literature 
addressing links and connections between politics and law, as well as 
between system and policy. Since some of these theories and thoughts 
also are consulted and contrasted in the four studies (Chapters 4-7), the 
reader is asked to show forbearance with later overlaps and repetitions.  
 
The structure of the following overview will also provide the structure for 
later discussions and conclusions in which the four research questions are 
responded to. First this chapter examines the relationship between politics 
and law, hence touching on one of the longest-lasting debates within 
international relations theory that has generated endless literature. Second 
it looks into another grand debate, addressing the relationship between 
analytical levels, notably between the international system and foreign 
policy. For analytical clarity, but also reflecting much of the theoretical 
work that is cited, one stylized causal link between a pair of factors will 
be presented at the time. Accordingly, consistent with the research 
questions, it will discuss in general terms how politics affects law, how 









2.2. International politics and International law 
 
Political constraints on international law 
 
«[N]o one can today affirm that such a thing as international law exists,» 
once wrote  United States Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles.1 A 
common notion is that international law reflects nothing more than the 
fundamental explanatory factors of interests and power. The influence of 
law itself on state behavior is thus marginal or irrelevant. Actors pursue 
their self-interests while forged in a structure of power that provides 
incentives for action. The world system is anarchic, in the sense that there 
is no executive or governing body over sovereign states. The absence of a 
legal order, represented with a legislature, judiciary and executive,2 
makes any conception of international law distinct from domestic law. 
The resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations are not 
binding to the member states. The International Court of Justice may only 
decide cases when both sides recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, and 
if they do the Court still cannot ensure compliance with its decisions. The 
Security Council of the United Nations is constrained by the veto power 
of the five permanent members, the USA, Russia, China, France and the 
United Kingdom.3  
 
                                                
1 Welles to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 October 1937. Cited in Ernst B. Haas 
and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1956), 385. 
2 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3 ed. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991; reprint, 1995), 3. Also see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-
1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 
2001), 159-61. 
3 Shaw, International Law, 2-4. 





«The absence of an executive power means that each state remains free, 
subject to the use of force […], to take such action as it thinks fit to 
enforce its own rights,» James Leslie Brierly once wrote.4 Hans 
Morgenthau points to decentralization as the essence of international law 
itself, an inevitable feature due to the principle of sovereignty of states.5 
While most international rules are mere expressions for or codification of 
identical or complementary interests of states and thus easily complied 
with, as Morgenthau writes, cases that affect the relative power of states 
are more problematic. «In those cases […] considerations of power rather 
than law determine compliance and enforcement,» he argues.6 Similarly, 
Stanley Hoffmann finds law to be of little relevance when clashing with 
strategic interests.7 
 
Law does not express any intentions or motives that cannot be reduced to 
basic causal factors that created it in the first place, scholars note. It is 
thus epiphenomenal, with no significant effect on actors’ behavior. Law 
does not create international order, but reflects it. Brierly writes: «When 
the circumstances are propitious, law is the sequel, but it is never the 
instrument, of the establishment of order».8 International law is a law of 
behavior, not as much for behavior.9 If all aspects of international 
                                                
4 James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law 
of Peace, 4 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 92-93. 
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7 
ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 316. 
6 Ibid., 302. 
7 Stanley Hoffmann, "International Law and the Control of Force," in The Relevance 
of International Law, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: 
Schenkman Publishing, 1968).  
8 James Leslie Brierly, The Outlook for International Law (Scientia Verlag Aalen 
1945; reprint, 1977), 74.  
9 Karl W. Deutsch, "The Probability of International Law," in The Relevance of 
International Law, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: 
Schenkman Publishing, 1968). 





relations – including law – detract from some basic causal political 
factors, one may as Morgenthau does define politics as «the concept of 
interest defined in terms of power».10 Institutions then essentially become 
«arenas for acting out power relationships».11 Hence international order is 
provided by the balance of power rather than legal commitments, a notion 
that has also been repeated by statesmen such as Henry Kissinger, who 
asserted that «there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice 
without restraint»,12 and Dean Acheson, who noted that law has no place 
when issues concern ultimate power, thus concluding that legal principles 
«do not decide concrete cases».13 Likewise, George Kennan warned 
against any legalistic approaches to international problems, observing that 
«our own national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and 
understanding».14 
 
Governments apply international law and characterize situations in legal 
terms that are most advantageous to their interests and objectives, notes 
Holsti,15 referring to case studies demonstrating that law is used to further 
                                                
10 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5. 
11 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School of 
International Relations: A Comparison," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
21, no. 3 (1992). Quoted in John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International 
Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-1995). 
12 Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1979). Quoted in Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What 
Is at Stake?," in Order and Justice in International Relations, ed. Rosemary Foot, 
John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
13 Dean Acheson, "Remarks," in International Rules: Approaches from International 
Law and International Relations, ed. Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend, and 
Robert D. Vander Lugt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
14 George F. Kennan, "Diplomacy in the Modern World," in International Rules: 
Approaches from International Law and International Relations, ed. Robert J. Beck, 
Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert D. Vander Lugt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996). 
15 K. J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 6 ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1992), 320. 





state objectives. International pursuits with reference to justice tend to 
coincide suspiciously with national interest.16 Self-interest, or self-
advantage, is also the most cited reason for compliance with international 
law.17 Indeed, regime theorists have argued that compliance with 
international commitments is rationally «possible, even likely».18 Failure 
of governments to comply endangers the institution of reciprocity, a 
principle that is often in their interest to maintain.19 Compliance with 
international law is thus explained in strict utilitarian terms, i.e., by 
coercion or self-interest.  
 
Prominent modern scholars have echoed this interpretation of a one-way 
causal link between international politics and law, which is characterized 
by Robert Keohane as an «instrumentalist optic».20 Robert Gilpin asserts 
that «[a]narchy is the rule; order, justice, and morality are the 
exceptions».21 In fact, states rarely engage in deep cooperation, note 
George Downs and David Rocke and Peter Barsoom. They find that 
                                                
16 John Lewis Gaddis, "Order Versus Justice: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma," 
in Order and Justice in International Relations, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis 
Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
17 For an overview, see Harold Hongju Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?," The Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2632. 
18 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law, International 
Relations and Compliance," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London-Thousand Oaks-New 
Dehli: Sage, 2005; reprint, 2005), 540. Also see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984; reprint, 2005), 62-64. 
19 See e.g. Andrew Hurrell, "International Society and the Study of Regimes: A 
Reflective Approach," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker 
Rittberger and Peter Mayer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 59. 
20 Robert O. Keohane, "International Relations and International Law: Two Optics," 
in Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, ed. Robert O. Keohane 
(London: Routledge, 2002). 
21 Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). 





«most treaties [addressing dysfunctional behavior] require states to make 
only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence 
of an agreement».22 John Mearsheimer finds that institutions – defined as 
a set of rules that regulate the interaction of states (similar to international 
law) – are merely reflections of the distribution of power.23 «What is 
most impressive about institutions, in fact,» writes Mearsheimer, «is how 
little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior».24 
However, this assertion has been challenged by others. 
 
 
Legal constraints on international politics 
 
«[L]aw is a major force in international affairs;» writes Louis Henkin, 
«nations rely on it, invoke it, observe and are influenced by it in every 
aspect of their foreign relations».25 International law structures the 
international «society» and, he argues, both formalize, regulate and 
determine the consequences of relationships among states.26 While 
Henkin regrets international law to be widely depreciated among 
international relations scholars, he sees the «forces for law observance 
mentioned are general, intangible, imponderable; they are not the less 
significant, and they are often determinative».27 
 
                                                
22 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News 
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" International Organization 50, 
no. 3 (1996), 380. 
23 Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." 
24 Ibid., 47. 
25 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 6. 
26 Ibid., 14-15. 
27 Ibid., 50. 





If determinative, international law must have autonomous effects on 
behavior, either directly or by significantly shaping political factors. The 
effects must go beyond those caused by political determinants. Such 
interpretation has by Keohane been labeled a «normative optic».28 
 
Rather than epiphenomenal to interest and power, law resembles other 
non-utilitarian variables used to explain behavior. Noted in social 
sciences, for instance, social norms are arguably operated mechanically 
or unconsciously, being ex ante sources of action. According to Jon Elster 
social norms have a «grip on the mind», not necessarily rational nor 
outcome-oriented.29 They guide behavior, but not by coercion or from 
self-interest. In international relations theory similar arguments have been 
made for the operations and effect of concepts relating to or converging 
with international law, such as values, norms, ideology, rules, institutions 
and regimes. (Attentively, international lawyers Abraham and Antonia 
Handler Chayes observe that political scientists «find it hard to say the 
‘L-word’», even though concepts such as international regimes «are what 
international law is all about»).30 
 
According to Stephen Krasner, regimes – defined as «principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge»31 – could be seen as «autonomous variables independently 
                                                
28 Keohane, "International Relations and International Law: Two Optics." 
29 Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989; reprint, 1994), 97-100. 
30 Abraham Chayes and Antonia Hadler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance 
with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1995), 303 footnote 3. 
31 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 





affecting not only related behavior and outcomes, but also the basic 
causal variables that led to their creation in the first place».32 Their 
functioning can thus not be derogates of «basic» causal factors of interest 
and power. While their intent may have been rational and rooted in the 
self-interest of states at the time of adoption, international regimes could 
take on an autonomous role once created. Krasner writes: 
 
Regimes may assume a life of their own, a life independent of the basic causal 
factors that led to their creation in the first place. There is not always 
congruity between underlying power capabilities, regimes, and related 
behavior and outcomes.33 
 
Once a regime is established it can alter the distribution of power in the 
system, that it might change states’ assessment of interests (and indirectly 
change behavior), or have direct effects on international affairs. Hence, 
Krasner claims that regimes are major explanatory variables in 
international relations, and is echoed by scholars including Oran Young, 
who has specifically addressed the role of international regimes in the 
Arctic region in his research.34 
 
                                                
32 Ibid., 21. 
33 ———, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," 
in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 357. 
34 See for instance Oran R. Young, Arctic Politics. Conflict and Cooperation in the 
Circumpolar North (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992), ———, 
Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), Oran R. Young and Osherenko Gail, eds., Polar 
Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993). 





International institutions are similarly approached as, not only the object 
of strategic choice, but «a constraint on actors’ behavior».35 According to 
Andrew Hurrell, even if created for instrumental purposes, institutions 
«act as platforms for ongoing normative debate, and for the mobilization 
of concern, and for debating and revising ideas about how international 
society should be organized». For that reason, international institutions 
«can shape, not merely reflect, communities of interest».36 International 
law, remark a number of international lawyers, reshapes and alters 
national interests through a process of justificatory discourse, and will 
thus have causal effect on international politics.37 
 
The causal effects of rules and norms may be subscribed to their 
legitimacy, concludes Thomas Franck, since legitimacy exhibits «a 
powerful pull to compliance».38 Legitimacy arises from the process 
through which international law was created or from its substance.39 If 
legitimacy provides an internal reason for a state to comply, then 
observance of international law is not caused by coercion or self-
interest.40 
 
An alternative causal mechanism has been suggested by Friedrich 
Kratochwil, who sees international rules as «a type of directive that 
                                                
35 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of 
International Institutions," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 729. 
36 Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What Is at Stake?" 33. 
37 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 14, Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance 
with International Regulatory Agreements, 26. Cited in Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?" 2602. 
38 Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy in the International System," American Journal of 
International Law 82 (1988), 759. 
39 Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," International 
Organization 53, no. 2 (1999), 381. 
40 Ibid., 387. 





simplify choice-situations by drawing attention to factors which an actor 
has to take into account».41 Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane have 
made a parallel argument for ideas, which they find to be a significant 
independent variable in explaining behavior as they order the world in 
ways that could profoundly shape outcomes.42 «[I]deas serve as road 
maps,» they argue. «Once ideas become embedded in rules and norms – 
that is, once they become institutionalized – they constrain public 
policy».43 Again concepts linked to international law are found to 
constrain behavior, directly or through reshaping interests. 
 
The normative pull to comply with international law is often emphasized, 
also by realists. Stanley Hoffmann argues that the legal system by 
definition is a normative one.44 E. H. Carr – who coined the dichotomy 
realism-utopianism – finds morality to be one of two cardinal factors in 
international relations (the other being power).45 Pacta sunt servanda is a 
maxim of good faith that obliges states to observe international 
agreements. Statesmen operating on an international arena may feel 
loyalties and obligations beyond national borders. Georges Scelle points 
to the dédoublement fonctionnel of government officials, individuals who 
would be acting on behalf of the international community as well as 
                                                
41 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; reprint, 1990). 
42 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical 
Framework," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, 
ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Cornell University Press, 1993). 
43 Ibid., 12. 
44 Stanley Hoffmann, "International Law and the Control of Force," in The Relevance 
of International Law, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: 
Schenkman, 1968), 21. 
45 Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations, 95. 





national interests.46 Although the actors in international law are 
representatives for states, they may as well be realizing the values or 
interests of the international community in large. Also here international 
law is seen as a determinant of international relations autonomous from 
politics, defined in terms of national interest and power. 
 
 
2.3. International system and foreign policy 
 
Systemic constraints on foreign policy 
 
«[T]he strong do what they have the power to, and the weak accept what 
they have to accept,» wrote Thucydides in his narrative on the war 
between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century B.C., paraphrasing 
Athenian representatives in the Melian Dialogue. The notion that state 
behavior reflects the distribution of power among international actors, 
i.e., the structure of the system, stands strong in international relations 
theory. If war is «merely the continuation of policy by other means», as 
argued by Carl von Clausewitz,47 military power could strongly affect the 
policy of states. Hoffmann asserts that weak and powerful states respond 
differently to risks of aggression and violence. «Small powers are forced, 
by their resources, their location, and the system, to be satisfied with 
                                                
46 Geores Scelle, Précis De Droit Des Gens; Principes Et Systématique, Par Georges 
Scelle, vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey (société anonyme), 1932-34). 
Presented and discussed in e.g. Hubert Thierry, "The European Tradition in 
International Law: Georges Scelle," European Journal of International law 1, no. 1-2 
(1990), Antonio Cassese, "Remarks on Scelle's Theory Of "Role Splitting" 
(Dédoublement Fonctionnel) in International Law," European Journal of 
International law 1, no. 1-2 (1990). 
47 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87. 





establishing a hierarchy of risks and with attempting to minimize the risks 
they consider to be most serious,» he summarizes.48  
 
Analytically the politics among states is distinguished from the making of 
foreign policy. «International politics is not foreign policy,» underlines 
Kenneth Waltz,49 who differentiates between the system (defined by its 
structure) and unit levels of analysis.50 Structure is the «constraints that 
confine all states», and thus explanations of foreign policy, argues 
Waltz.51 Gilpin, labeled structural realist (or neorealist) along with Waltz 
and others, asserts that international structure «constrains and in fact 
powerfully influences behavior».52 Structural effect on state behavior is a 
presupposition made by all structural realists.53 Policies of strong states 
differ from policies of weak ones.54 Shifts in relative power lead to shifts 
in foreign policy, demonstrate Aaron Friedberg and Melvyn Leffler.55 
 
By stressing the impact of external forces on states’ behavior, most 
notably in terms of relative power, structural realists challenge 
                                                
48 Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of 
International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), 138. 
49 Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 
6, no. 1 (1996). 
50 ———, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 121-
23. In contrast to this dissertation, Waltz distinguishes between the systems level and 
the level of interacting units. 
51 Ibid., 122. 
52 Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 318. 
53 For an overview, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign 
Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998). 
54 Michael Mandelbaum, The Fates of Nations: The Search for National Security in 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988). Cited by Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." 
55 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative 
Decline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), Melvyn P. Leffler, A 
Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the 
Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). Both cited in Rose, 
"Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." 





explanations on behavior exclusively in terms of domestic factors, what is 
referred to as «inside-out explanations».56 Indeed foreign policy is most 
commonly analyzed in the context of Innenpolitik.57 The discipline 
referred to as foreign policy analysis, usually addressing foreign policy 
decision-making, has taken on a number of directions stressing different 
predominantly domestic causes.58 Some find populism to be influential, 
arguing that «public opinion plays a significant, sometimes central role in 
U.S. foreign policy».59 Allison and Zelikow point to the influence of 
organizational behavior and governmental politics in their foreign policy 
analysis.60 Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that domestic lobbyists 
may have profound impact on policymaking,61 like others before them 
have found interest groups to shape foreign policy.62 Foreign policy 
explanation that highlights Innenpolitik factors, summarizes Walter 
Carlsnaes, include approaches that stress cognitive and psychological 
                                                
56 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 63. 
57 Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." 
58 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988). 
59 Summarized by David A. Deese, "Making American Foreign Policy in the 1990s," 
in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, ed. David A. Deese (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994). See Thomas Graham, "Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 
Decision Making," in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, ed. David A. 
Deese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, 
"Foreign Policy and Public Opinion," in The New Politics of American Foreign 
Policy, ed. David A. Deese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). 
60 Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, 2 ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). 
61 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
62 V. M. Hudson, S. M. Sims, and J. C. Thomas, "The Domestic Political Context of 
Foreign Policy-Making: Explicating a Theoretical Construct," in The Limits of State 
Autonomy, ed. D. Skidmore and V. M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 
Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 
Twenty-First Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Glenn J. 
Antizzo, and Leila E. Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process: Modes of 
Legislative Behavior (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000). 





factors, bureaucratic and neoinstitutional politics, crisis behavior, policy 
implementation and group decision-making processes.63 
 
While realism in general suffers under indefinite concepts such as 
national interests, and power appropriately described as «one of the most 
troublesome [concepts] in the field of international relations»,64 the 
structural approach forcefully points to the shortcomings of an 
Innenpolitik approach in foreign policy analysis.65 It identifies the 
constraints of external factors on policy-making, calling on foreign policy 
analysts to view the behavior of one state unit in relation to others, i.e., 
relating policy to the international system. 
 
 
Foreign policy influence on the system 
 
Even if the structure of the international system were defined in terms of 
power distribution, the structure would still be reducible to the properties 
of its units.66 Since the system is irrevocably linked to or defined as the 
interaction of units, it is evident that policy changes can bring about 
systems change. K. J. Holsti remarks that «governments, most of the 
time, respond to the actions and policies of other governments; that is, to 
those that take the initiatives that are perceived to have some impact on 
                                                
63 Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2002; reprint, 2005). With references therein. 
64 Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 13. 
65 Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy." 
66 Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987). 





one’s own interests, principles, and preferences».67 Effects of foreign 
policy on the system are self-evident when the system is defined in terms 
of interaction.  
 
The influence of state behavior on the international system has been 
highlighted through the so-called agent-structure debate within 
international relations theory. While the debate has been highly abstract, 
with focus on ontological and epistemological issues,68 it points to the 
problem of making system structures or actors into primitive units of 
analysis, since both may be regarded dependent variables. Scholars 
suggest the system and its units to be «co-determined» or «mutually 
constituted» entities.69 However the interplay between state behavior and 
the structure of the system is familiar to Waltz. In a response to his 
critics, he stressed that, «[n]either structure nor units determine outcomes. 
Each affects the other.»70 
 
«[T]he state’s policy not only probes the environment but can alter it,» 
writes Robert Jervis.71 But the effects of one state’s foreign policy on 
others’ are not necessarily functional. Describing the international 
ramifications of foreign policy, Jervis outlines the psychological 
dynamics of perceptions and misperceptions, where intentions of one 
                                                
67 Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 273. 
68 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 26. 
69 Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," 339. 
Also see Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy 
Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992). 
70 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to 
My Critics," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 328. 
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state’s policies are not clear to the other(s): The peaceful intentions of 
one state can be misinterpreted as aggressive by another. Due to 
perceptions and misperceptions, foreign policies have systemic effects 
that are not accounted for by «the Spiral Model», as Jervis labels 
structural realist theories,72 but can still set off the self-fulfilling 
prophecies embedded in these deterrence theories. 
 
For states to react and respond to one specific foreign policy in a systemic 
interaction, they need to direct attention outward. Not all foreign policies 
spur interaction. The policy of one unit has to be observed, processed and 
responded to by others for systemic interaction to occur. But, as observed 
in behavioral theory, the necessary attention is not a given, and rationality 
is bounded.73 With infinite potential issues to attend to, statesmen suffer 
under shortage of information processing capacity. Herbert Simon, 
addressing decision-making in administrative organizations, explains: 
 
Attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational activity, and the bottleneck 
becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of organizations, 
where parallel processing capacity becomes less easy to provide without 
damaging the coordination function that is a prime responsibility of these 
levels.74 
 
Policymaking preconditions a choice opportunity, asserts Johan Olsen,75 
or, as formulated by K. J. Holsti, a foreign policy «occasion».76 New 
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knowledge can shift attention to new issue-areas. Ernst Haas argues that 
«interests can be (but need not be) informed by available knowledge, and 
that power is normally used to translate knowledge-informed interests 
into policy and programs».77 
 
It is not evident that states proactively assess and pursue national interests 
beyond its borders. On the contrary, as demonstrated in earlier studies, it 
often takes events to make state officials aware of one issue rather than 
another.78 Governments have «agendas thrust on them», some argue,79 
making foreign policy reactive rather than proactive. Dan Wood and 
Jeffrey Peake elaborate: 
 
As new issues emerge, political actors are not free to choose attention levels. 
Rather, they must attend to issues of continuing importance until they are 
resolved or displaced in the economy of attention.80 
 
Changes in the international system, defined as the interaction of state 
units, may accordingly be chain reactions triggered by exogenous events 
as well as changes in the policies of a single unit. Hence, policy may 
change the system. 
 
 
                                                
77 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in 
International Organization (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). 
78 See for instance B. Dan Wood and Jeffrey S. Peake, "The Dynamics of Foreign 
Policy Agenda Setting," The American Political Science Review 92, no. 1 (1998). 
Jeffrey S. Peake, "Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy," Political Research 
Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2001). Lydia Andrade and Garry Young, "Presidential Agenda 
Setting: Influences on the Emphasis of Foreign Policy," Political Research Quarterly 
49, no. 3 (1996). 
79 Wood and Peake, "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting," 178. 
80 Ibid. 





2.4. Theoretical framework 
 
The four research questions raised by the introductory chapter address 
connections between politics and law on one hand, and between the 
system and policy on the other. In order for this dissertation to respond 
adequately to these research questions, this chapter examined previous 
work addressing the relevant causal links between the two pairs of 
factors. Rather than recounting theoretical approaches to the whole field 
on international relations, the chapter has explored postulations of causal 
linkages between the subjects for this dissertation, i.e., politics and law as 
well as system and policy. The focus of the chapter has thus been on 
causal mechanisms and connections between the relevant factors. As the 
discussions above have shown, the causal links may be ambiguous. 
 
 
Politics and law 
 
First, this chapter examined theories that regarded international law as 
epiphenomenal to politics, explained by the arguably cardinal factors of 
interest and power. In an anarchic world, international law reflects order 
or codifies patterns of behavior rather than creating them. Accordingly, 
law itself is an insignificant determinant of international relations. 
Compliance with international law is explained in strict utilitarian terms, 
notably by coercion and or self-interest. 
 
However, the idea that all aspects of international affairs are 
epiphenomenal to interest and power has been widely challenged. As the 
chapter has shown, scholars have pointed to the constraining influence of 





regimes, institutions, rules, norms, values, et cetera, on behavior. These 
concepts, which may be related to or converge with the concept of 
international law (applicable legal rules, norms and standards that apply 
among states), are said to have autonomous effects on international 
relations. They even shape national interests and alter the distribution of 
power, and accordingly explain politics, even when strictly defined in 
terms of interest and power. 
 
These contradicting causal connections between politics and law will be 
revisited in the concluding chapter, where the four research questions of 
this dissertation are addressed. The two first questions – asking how 
politics affect the outlook for a legal settlement, and how certain legal 
procedures affect politics in Svalbard waters – call for studies of links 
between these factors. As these questions are addressed, in the studies of 
Chapters 4 and 5 as well as in the concluding chapter, the problem of 
drawing causal connections becomes even more evident. This dissertation 
will on one hand find that states are reluctant to pursue a legal settlement, 
even in a dispute cast as a legal conflict over treaty interpretation. The 
contending parties accept uncertainty, and their relations feature a low 
degree of legalization. Adjudication is considered politically costly, not 
least because it would be a fundamental encroachment on state 
sovereignty.81 On the other hand, the dissertation will also find that legal 
rules for determining outer limits for the continental shelf have 
explanatory effects on politics in the Svalbard offshore area. Procedures 
established by international law guide states to abandon earlier positions 
                                                
81 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance," International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000). 





regarding their rights outside Svalbard, and these effects seem to go 
beyond what may be explained by self-interest or coercion. 
 
 
System and policy 
 
This chapter has also explored the relationship between the international 
system and foreign policy. Commonly the system is regarded a given, 
with explanatory effects on the policies of its units. Most notably 
structural realists, whose focus is often on the material and tangible 
structure of the system rather than the interaction of its units, see the 
structure of the system as the constraints than confine all states. To 
safeguard its own security each state consults its surroundings, and its 
policies are hence responsive to, and partly explained by, external factors. 
 
As demonstrated, this causal connection between the system and policy 
has been debated in literature. Some point to an opposite causal direction 
between these factors, since one state’s policy can alter the system, also 
through misperceptions. Thus, scholars argue that the system and its units 
are co-determined or mutually constituted entities, where policy changes 
may have systemic ramifications. States respond to the actions and 
policies of others, so that a new policy of one state may set off systemic 
chain reactions. In effect, policy change in one state produces a foreign 
policy occasion or choice opportunities for others. 
 
The dynamics between the international system and foreign policy are 
subjects of the two latter research questions of the dissertation, asking 
how the system affects the policies of Norway in the Svalbard area, and 





also how the policies of Norway affect the system. The theoretical 
postulations discussed here will therefore be related to the case of the 
Svalbard offshore areas. The links between system and policy in the 
Svalbard case are examined further in Chapters 6 and 7 as well as in the 
concluding chapter. The dissertation will show that Norway is widely 
constrained by external factors, its policies and their enforcement curbed 
in order to safeguard or promote peace and stability. But again the causal 
link between system and policy is ambiguous or even paradoxical: The 
dissertation will demonstrate that the system is highly responsive to 
Norway’s policies and their enforcement. 
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The first chapter established that the purpose of the dissertation is to 
explore the politics–law and system–policy processes that induce conflict 
and order in the maritime zones around Svalbard, while the previous 
chapter examined links between each pair of factors as they have been 
explored in scholarly literature. This chapter explains the methods used 
for studying the two processes and their impact on the areas off the shores 
of Svalbard. 
 
The dissertation focuses on a case featuring international controversy 
over sovereign rights. As noted in its introduction, four case-specific 
research questions specify how the politics–law and system–policy 
processes are to be explored. The first question inquires if political 
factors hinder a legal settlement for the Svalbard issue; the second asks if 
legal rules for continental shelf delineation influence politics; the third 
asks if systemic conditions affect Norway’s policies; while the fourth 
queries if the policies of Norway affect the international system. The two 
former questions relate to the relationship between politics and law, while 
the two latter address the interactions between the international system 
and foreign policy. Answers to the four research questions are provided 
in the concluding chapter based on the studies reproduced in extenso as 
Chapters 4-7. 
 
The four studies in Chapters 4-7 address research problems that largely 
correspond to or cover the research questions asked by this dissertation. 
Their methodologies follow from the respective research questions that 
are asked. Such a research strategy, deriving from circumstances and 





research problems rather than an ideological commitment or pre-
determined ontology, follows a «logic of design».1 Also noted by Robert 
Yin, in case study «the first and most important condition for 
differentiating among the various research strategies is to identify the 
type of research question being asked».2 Accordingly, specific 
methodologies will be evident from the four studies.3 This chapter will 
address overarching methodological considerations and challenges 
common to the dissertation and the four studies. First it presents the 
research strategy of the dissertation, then it examines possible sources of 





The dissertation relates to the world as objective and knowable, separate 
from the observing individual. Its research problems and its studies 
address causality between variables, notably the interplay of certain 
factors that affect (or are assumed to affect) the maritime areas off of 
Svalbard. However, although such epistemology is dominantly 
                                                
1 Jennifer Platt, ""Case Study" In American Methodological Thought," Current 
Sociology 40, no. 1 (1992): 46.  
2 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, 3 ed. (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 2003), 7. 
3 See Torbjørn Pedersen, "The Svalbard Continental Shelf - Legal Disputes and 
Political Rivalries," Ocean Development and International Law 37, no. 3-4 (2006) 
(Chapter 4); Torbjørn Pedersen and Tore Henriksen, "Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: 
The End of Legal Uncertainty?" submitted (Chapter 5); Torbjørn Pedersen, "The 
Constrained Politics of the Svalbard Offshore Area," Marine Policy, in press (2008) 
(Chapter 6); and Torbjørn Pedersen, "The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy," 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 19, no. 2 (2008) (Chapter 7). 





objective,4 the dissertation will not make an explicit commit to any one 
system of philosophy.5 Instead, it joins ranks with research traditions that 
make room for methodological diversity.6 
 
This dissertation will not seek to produce a general «conceptual 
framework within which a whole discipline is cast».7 Rather, it is a case-
specific analysis that ventures to find «the right angle, the method, the 
model, the concepts which should be the most fruitful for an analysis of 
data».8 Being primarily case-oriented rather than driven by theoretical or 
methodological ends, the methodology is diverse and eclectic. As is 
common also in foreign policy analysis, the dissertation probes multiple 
sources of evidence.9 A too stringent and narrow research strategy could 
strangle the study, particularly in cases where evidence seems scarce, 
while a more dynamic approach allows a wider variety of data to be 
collected and interrelated.  
 
The process of combining different sources of evidence is the hallmark of 
case study research. As defined by John Creswell, case study is as a 
                                                
4 Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2002; reprint, 2005). 
5 John W. Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 12. 
6 Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). 
7 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 57. 
8 Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 29. 
9 Eric V. Larson, "Putting Theory to Work: Diagnosing Public Opinion on the U.S. 
Intervention in Bosnia," in Being Useful: Policy Pelevance and International 
Relations Theory, ed. Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold (The University of 
Michigan Press, 2000), 175. 





strategy where «researchers collect detailed information using a variety of 
data collection procedures over a sustained period of time».10 Evidence 
from a wide range of secondary sources, including news reports and 
academic literature, is combined with primary evidence from multiple 
sources. 
 
Yin points to the combination of evidence from different sources as the 
very strength of case study research. According to him, «any finding or 
conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and 
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information».11 
Triangulating, a naval expression for crossing two or more known 
bearings to determine an exact position, is a metaphor that illustrates how 
the combination of evidence from multiple sources increase scientific 
precision. In the analyses of this dissertation, evidence from several 
sources is cross-referenced and checked to enhance validity and 
reliability.  
 
Since pluralism among sources of primary evidence adds validity and 
reliability to the analysis, this dissertation and its studies have probed the 
possible sources of evidence to answer their respective research 
questions. Yin’s list of six different primary sources of case study 
evidence is the point of departure. Sources are documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and 
physical artifacts. Below, the limitations and challenges associated with 
each source of evidence are discussed, as is their contribution to this 
                                                
10 Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 
Approaches, 15.  
11 Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, 98. 





dissertation. The discussion will account for the choice of sources of 
evidence and their relevance, application, utility and limitations. 
 
 
3.2. Sources of primary evidence 
 
Documents and archival records 
 
A case involving both national interests, security, foreign policy and 
diplomatic relations would normally generate large quantities of 
documents, producing everything from departmental memoranda and 
letters to strategy reports and diplomatic note exchanges. The research 
problem determines what parts of the correspondence would be relevant 
to obtain for analysis, as discussed above. In general, however, only a 
fraction of the pertinent documents is immediately accessible to the 
researcher, since much correspondence is restricted from public access, 
classified or for different reasons inaccessible or difficult to obtain. In the 
Svalbard offshore case a limited number of relevant public documents 
have been immediately accessible. Among those are White Papers, press 
releases and speech transcripts made available by the respective 
authorities. 
 
Other documents have been disclosed on the request from the researcher. 
For this dissertation, several requests for documents have been made to 
actors involved in the Svalbard offshore controversies. The researcher 
have invoked the respective freedom of information acts (or equivalent) 
in search for specific documents, or requested access to archives. Most 
document evidence for this dissertation has been made available after 





such requests, including correspondence between national ministries 
and/or public agencies,12 between private actors and national 
authorities,13 between governments,14 as well as internal memoranda.15 In 
some instances disclosure has only been made after formal appeals to 
initial rejections.16  
 
In some instances, documents have remained undisclosed. Restrictions on 
access are pursuant to exceptions in respective freedom of information 
acts and regulations, such as in United States Freedom of Information Act 
§552 (b), inter alia allowing documents to be kept «in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy»,17 or EU Regulation no. 1049/2001 
Article 4.5, giving a member state the authority to deny disclosure of its 
correspondence with the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission,18 or Norway’s Offentlighetsloven §6 allowing public 
authorities to classify documents «containing information which, if it 
were to be disclosed, could be detrimental to the security of the realm, 
                                                
12 For example, letter from Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, offering advice on how to the handle the Russian interest for 
the continental shelf around Svalbard, 4 March 2005.  
13 For instance, notification of planned scientific research around Svalbard from 
Marine Arctic Geological Expedition (MAGE) to Norwegian authorities, 18 January 
2005. 
14 A number of foreign ministries have formally made most of their international 
correspondence available for this dissertation, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Norway. 
15 For instance, Iceland’s Tomas Heidar, "The Svalbard Issue," March 2006. Personal 
communication (e-mail), 29 November 2006, and Norway’s L. T. Løddesøl, 
"NOTAT: Svalbard – Kontinentalsokkelen," 9 May 1964. Archival research at the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2007.   
16 For instance, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied access to 
diplomatic correspondence with the United Kingdom on 4 May 2006 but complied 
with the researcher’s appeal on 13 June 2006. Personal communication (letters), 4 
May and 13 June 2006. 
17 The Freedom of Information Act, §552 (b)(1)(A) 
18 For instance, Spain refused disclosure of the correspondence with the EU amid the 
seizure of Spanish vessels in the fisheries protection zone in 2004 and 2006. European 
Commission DG Fisheries, personal communication (e-mail), 20 March 2007. 





national defense or relations with foreign states of international 
organizations». 
 
This hinder has however partially been overcome by requesting 
documents from all relevant parties. As correspondence always includes 
at least two parties (a sender and a receiver), it has been possible to obtain 
documents classified by one party from the other. For instance, although 
Iceland denied the researcher access to its diplomatic note exchanges 
with Norway, the documents were retrieved from Norway. While Norway 
initially turned down the request for access to its correspondence with the 
United Kingdom, the diplomatic notes were made available by the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.19 
 
Several archives have also been probed in search for documents relating 
to the Svalbard offshore controversy. Access to the archives of the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conditioned prior security 
clearance, which was granted only after a background check in personal 
records. Processing a request may also be time-consuming, in some 
instances too time-consuming. The Reagan Library initially indicated a 
73-month processing queue of the request and could thus not be accessed 
within the timeframe for this dissertation,20 and the United States 
Department of Defense (Pentagon) spent almost a year on just registering 
the request.21 Archival records from the United States Department of 
                                                
19 United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, personal communication (e-
mail), 14 July 2006. 
20 Ronald Reagan Library, personal communication (letter) F07-037, 26 February 
2007. 
21 U.S. Department of Defense, personal communication (letter) 08-F-0407, 18 
December 2007. 





State and from Denmark’s national archives Rigsarkivet were obtained, 
but not in time to be incorporated into this research.22  
 
Archival research may also be subjected to conditions that seem 
incompatible with the principle of free and independent research. At one 
point the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed full manuscript 
control on the researcher,23 a condition that was not included in an initial 
research agreement,24 since the documents were partially graded 
restricted and classified. Full manuscript control could however raise 
questions about the researcher’s integrity and independence, and the 
order was thus opposed. The situation was resolved, and the Ministry was 
only submitted for control those parts of the manuscript that had been 
based on classified archival records. Citations in this dissertation from 
records obtained from the archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 





Through interviews the individuals involved in one subject matter may 
account for their decisions (including non-decisions) and actions. 
Interviews are invaluable as sources of evidence when the research 
problem concern motives or in other ways relates to variables assumed to 
                                                
22 Denmark’s Udenrigsminesteriet, personal communication (e-mail), 16 November 
2007. 
23 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nedgraderingsutvalget), personal 
communication (e-mails and telephone), 31 May, 24 May and 21 May 2007. 
24 Torbjørn Pedersen, Self-Declaration Form of 19 March 2007 regarding access to 
the archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 





influence behavior. Hence interviews are effective for tracing causal links 
as well as for fact-finding.  
 
The challenge is again access. As already noted, although a number of 
governments are involved in the Svalbard offshore controversy, the 
individuals of the decision-making processes are relatively few. Issues of 
state security, foreign relations and international disputes are generally 
dealt with on a high governmental level, often involving heads of states, 
their respective ministers and selected officials. High-ranking decision-
makers, belonging to the group labeled elites in social science literature, 
are thus relatively few compared with the number of actors involved in 
issues that are more publicly debated and decided on. To the researcher, 
these circumstances narrow down the number of relevant respondents and 
the range of interview methods available, ruling out survey interviewing 
for one. 
 
Interviewing statesmen possessing in-depth knowledge and expert insight 
on the research topic is referred to as intensive, elite or specialized 
interviewing. This is regarded an effective research technique for 
obtaining information on contemporary decision-making processes.25 But 
as with documents, obtaining access to elites is a challenge. Peter 
Burnham, Karin Gillam, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry recognize 
access as «the biggest problem» in elite interviewing.26 
 
Phone, mail and e-mail enquiries for interviews to heads of foreign affairs 
or their representatives are often ineffective. Generally, high-level 
                                                
25 Peter Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 205. 
26 Ibid., 208. 





decision-makers are less accessible than low-level decision-makers, but 
do become more accessible outside their offices.27 To access relevant 
respondents for this dissertation, appointments have sometimes been 
made amid seminars, conferences or other public events. The downside is 
that the interviews in such settings, with no set time frame, are 
unpredictable and may become a mixture of semi-structured interview 
and informal conversation, labeling it according to the categories drawn 
up by David Gray.28  
 
Conditions for elite interviews have thus not always been ideal. In 
literature the interview is often depicted as a cozy and lengthy affair. 
Hillary Arksey and Peter Knight suggest that the interview takes place 
«in comfortable and familiar surroundings», and that the researcher goes 
through an eight-point checklist before questions are asked, e.g. 
indicating «the significance of the study», referring «in positive terms to 
other interviews» and confirming «your commitment to research 
ethics».29 In practice, the settings have rarely allowed for extensive 
efforts for «fostering a climate of trust», as Arksey and Knight put it. 
Elite interviews have occasionally taken place in noisy environments 
under obvious time constraints, where the respondents at times have been 
interrupted. 
 
Obtaining verifiable interview data may be problematic. Officials at times 
talk less freely about sensitive issues when on-record than off. But the use 
                                                
27 For instance, foreign ministers Jan Petersen (15 April 2005) and Jonas Gahr Støre 
(1 December 2006), deputy minister Kim Traavik (15 April 2005) and former UK 
legal counsellor David Anderson (25 January 2007) have been interviewed outside 
their offices. 
28 David E. Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (London: Sage, 2004), 215-18. 
29 Hillary Arksey and Peter Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists (London: Sage, 
1999), 101-02. 





of anonymous sources poses a problem to the researcher. It makes data 
more difficult to verify, hence undermining its scientific value. 
Accordingly off-record elite interviews, although valuable for 
background probing, could be difficult to transform into verifiable 
research evidence. If evidence is obtained on condition of anonymity, the 
data may seem less reliable and valid. Notwithstanding, interview 
evidence cited by this dissertation is predominantly on-record data from 
named sources, and these have been taped for accuracy. 
 
The small number of relevant respondents, their limited accessibility, and 
restraints on interview situations, make elite interviewing a challenging 
undertaking. Partly due to these circumstances, Burnham et al. warn 
against basing research entirely on elite interviewing.30 
 
 
Observation and artifacts 
 
Observation requires a field visit to the case study site. In participant-
observation, the researcher takes actively part in the phenomenon studied, 
while direct observation is a passive study of the social activity 
undergoing research. In the Svalbard offshore case, arenas for decision-
making are numerous, and include rooms and offices in the buildings of 
all governments that are parties to the controversy.  
 
Common to these arenas are their inaccessibility to the outsider. Sensitive 
topics are treated as such, usually in confidence and without audience. 
Only rarely does evidence such as the tape recordings of the White House 
                                                
30 Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, 206. 





deliberations during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis become available.31 
Keeping in mind the difficulties of making appointments for interviews 
with individual high-ranking decision-makers, gaining invitation to such 
forums is often unrealistic. 
 
Only some arenas of limited relevance to the Svalbard offshore case have 
been open to the observer. For this dissertation actors have been observed 
in public settings such as parliamentary debates32 and in press 
conferences.33 The two-day Supreme Court Case 2006/871 between the 
Norwegian prosecution and Spanish ship-owners and captains was also 
audited in connection with this research, and data was collected from the 
public procedures.34 The researcher has also requested admission to 
Norwegian coast guard vessels patrolling the 200 nm fisheries protection 
zone adjacent to Svalbard, but the opportunity has to date not arisen. 
 
Based on the research questions, physical artifacts (beyond written 






                                                
31 Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, 2 ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 313. 
32 For instance, Norwegian parliament Stortinget, Meeting 15 June 2005, Case No. 5. 
For transcript see <http://www.stortinget.no/stid/2004/s050615-05.html> (accessed 3 
January 2008).    
33 For instance, Kjell Magne Bondevik, press conference in Tromsø, 15 April 2005. 
34 Supreme Court case 2006/871, Manuel Aldao Gago, Angel Lecertua Lizarzaburv 
og Pesquera Laurak Bat S.A. v. Den offentlige påtalemyndighet, 23-24 October 2006. 
 





3.3. Methodological framework 
 
Research on sensitive topics, including international disputes over 
sovereign rights, often suffers under the shortage of primary evidence. As 
noted above, documents are often classified, respondents are usually 
inaccessible, and decision-making arenas are generally closed to the 
researcher. Indeed many studies addressing the controversies over rights 
outside Svalbard fall victims for methodological constraints. They 
become heavily reliant on secondary sources, most notably news reports, 
which challenges the validity and reliability of their findings. One 
common methodological solution has been to lower the scientific 
ambition and address media sources as primary, for instance by studying 
the public discourse over a given policy issue rather than the making of 
that policy. Indeed, amid the methodological challenges discussed above, 
constructivist approaches and discourse analyses have become relatively 
popular, also in addressing the case of the Svalbard offshore area.  
 
Another popular approach, similarly convenient if empirical evidence 
seems scarce, simply assumes actors to be rational. As noted by 
economist Thomas Schelling, «you can sit in your armchair and try to 
predict how people will behave by asking how you would behave if you 
had your wits about you. You get, free of charge, a lot of vicarious, 
empirical behavior.»35 Outcome is simply projected through Game 
Theory. 
 
                                                
35 Thomas Schelling, quoted in Kathleen Archibald, ed., Strategic Interaction and 
Conflict: Original Papers and Discussion (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies 
of the University of California, 1966), 150. 





In contrast, the empirical approach adopted by this dissertation pursues 
primary sources of evidence, despite the obvious challenges of access. To 
maintain standards for validity and reliability, multiple sources of 
evidence have been probed and combined. By the methods explained 
above, data has been collected from numerous actors, notably those most 
involved in the international row over rights outside Svalbard. As primary 
data from multiple sources and numerous actors has been gathered, the 
empirical evidence has in fact proved to be rich, extensive and sufficient:  
 
For instance, this dissertation has accessed a comprehensive diplomatic 
communication regarding the maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard. While 
not fully exhaustive, it has consulted most if not all relevant diplomatic 
notes handed to Norway by other states. By probing numerous 
governments, evidence has been crosschecked, supplemented and 
expanded. In fact, the bulk of the diplomatic communication, hitherto 
undisclosed, has been declassified in the course of this research. 
Governments have also made other relevant documents available, 
including memoranda and domestic correspondence, thus producing 
much of the empirical material called for by the research questions of this 
dissertation and its four studies. 
 
Documents and archival records are supplemented with interview data. 
Again challenges of access to sources have been overcome by the 
methods discussed above. While not conducted in perfect settings, all 
interviews planned for this dissertation have been carried out. Among 
targeted interviewees are top decision-makers, including two foreign 
ministers and a number of high-ranking officials, not only in Norway but 
also in other involved governments. By accessing these primary interview 





targets evidence has not been distorted, as they would have been if 
collected from others than the involved decision-makers. 
 
In sum, despite the challenges that have been discussed above, this 
dissertation has had a unique access to evidence, or in other ways yielded 
new and extensive evidence, relating to the Svalbard offshore case. Thus, 
although not its explicit purpose, this dissertation makes a significant 
empirical contribution to the study of international affairs in the Euro-
Arctic region. By probing multiple sources of evidence and obtaining 
data from different states involved in the controversy, the quality of the 
data are enhanced. As in navigation, triangulation has increased 
precision.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 












The previous four chapters demonstrated how international politics 
obstruct a legal resolution of the dispute over rights outside Svalbard 
even after states have flagged their intention of seeking adjudication;1 
how legal rules for deciding continental shelf limits indeed constrain 
international politics toward the Svalbard offshore area;2 how the foreign 
policies of Norway in the area are curbed amid fears of international 
repercussions;3 and how Norway’s diplomatic efforts and exercise of 
jurisdiction have had unintended systemic ramifications.4 
 
The objective of this chapter is to relate these findings to the overall 
research purpose of this dissertation and answer the four specific research 
questions that were raised in its introduction. To recapitulate from 
Chapter 1, the purpose is to explore processes that affect the Svalbard 
offshore areas, that is, the dynamics of international politics and 
international law on one hand, and the exchanges between the 
international system and foreign policy on the other. The four questions 
were: 
 
• How (if at all) does politics in the Svalbard offshore areas affect 
the outlook for a legal settlement of disputes? 
                                                
1 Torbjørn Pedersen, "The Svalbard Continental Shelf - Legal Disputes and Political 
Rivalries," Ocean Development and International Law 37, no. 3-4 (2006). (Chapter 4) 
2 Torbjørn Pedersen and Tore Henriksen, "Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of 
Legal Uncertainty?" submitted. (Chapter 5) 
3 Torbjørn Pedersen, "The Constrained Politics of the Svalbard Offshore Area," 
Marine Policy in press (2008). (Chapter 6) 
4 ———, "The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy," Diplomacy & Statecraft 19, no. 2 
(2008). (Chapter 7) 





• How (if at all) do legal rules for determining continental shelf 
limits affect politics toward the Svalbard offshore areas? 
• How (if at all) does the international system affect the policies of 
Norway toward the Svalbard offshore areas? 
• How (if at all) do the policies of Norway toward the Svalbard 
offshore areas affect the international system? 
 
The two former questions concern the relationship between international 
politics and international law, while the two latter concern the 
relationship between the international system and foreign policy. As will 
be recalled from Chapter 2, many scholars have explored the causal links 
between politics and law, as well as between system and policy, but their 
understandings differ. 
 
Elaborated on below, Chapters 4-7 reveal ambiguous and paradoxical 
causal connections between politics and law and between the system and 
policy. In effect, the studies also disclose a politics-law process as well as 
a system-policy process, and expose some mechanisms through which 
these processes induce conflict and order in the Svalbard offshore areas.  
 
The studies reproduced as Chapters 4 and 5 relate to the first two research 
questions that were raised and address the interplay of politics and law. 
States with conflicting interests and different power capabilities are 
expressing incompatible legal positions, while steering clear of 
adjudication and other steps that would produce a definite settlement. 
Law seemingly bows to politics. Still, legal rules for delineating the 
continental shelf are reshaping the positions of states, and accordingly 






Findings presented in Chapters 6 and 7 point to the relationship between 
two analytical levels, addressed as the international system and foreign 
policy, and how this affects the Svalbard offshore areas. The results relate 
to the two latter research questions of the dissertation. Paradoxically, 
while one study finds that the policies of Norway are constrained by 
systemic conditions, the other explains how systemic conditions are 
influenced by the policies of Norway. The findings identify mechanisms 




8.2. International politics and international law 
 
Bowing to politics 
 
The study rendered as Chapter 4 established the dominance of politics 
over international law even in a controversy that is essentially cast in 
legal terms. Although conflicting views and positions in the Svalbard 
offshore area relate to legal interpretations of the Svalbard Treaty, the 
Law of the Sea Convention and general international law – hence a 
matter of legal theory – the courses of action seem guided by non-legal 
determinants, including the interests and power of the contending parties. 
States have indeed expressed military-strategic, energy-strategic and/or 
economic interests in these contested ocean areas. Conflicting interests, 
more than differences in theoretical principles of treaty interpretation, 
also underline the graveness of the dispute and the fears it causes in 
Norway.5 The general notion of law bowing to politics, as suggested by 
                                                
5 Chapter 6. 





realist scholars within international relations research, has been 
strengthened by the study of conflict resolution processes for the 
controverted maritime zones adjacent to Svalbard: 
 
Addressing a topic that encompasses the first of the four research 
questions of this dissertation, Chapter 4 searched for processes aimed at 
settling the disputes relating to the maritime zones around Svalbard. As 
has been noted by Abbott et al., states may «pursue their claims 
diplomatically or through any formal dispute procedure they have 
accepted».6 The first has a low degree of legalization, the latter a high 
degree.7 First assuming the controversies over rights in the maritime areas 
to be legal, it searched for conflict resolution activities advised by 
international law, in other words procedures with a high degree of 
legalization. The Svalbard Treaty itself does not provide any dispute 
settlement mechanisms, but states are imposed to seek a resolution by 
peaceful means by Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations.8 
Dispute settlement should be reached, if not through diplomatic methods, 
through adjudication by a disinterested third-party.9 Notwithstanding its 
legal character, the Svalbard area dispute is not sought settled through 
any of these mechanisms. The study found that Norway refuses to 
negotiate over its rights in the maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard with 
the other contending parties, and it also rules out a revision of the 
Svalbard Treaty by voluntary methods involving good offices and 
mediation, inquiry, conciliation and arbitration. With a negotiated 
                                                
6 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., "The Concept of Legalization," International 
Organization 53, no. 3 (2000), 409. 
7 Ibid., 404. 
8 Also see the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 279. 
9 See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3 ed. (New York: Cambridge University 






settlement thus precluded, contending states would be expected to refer 
their legal case to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. 
Norway recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and assures 
that it is ready to argue its case if it is referred to The Hague. Both 
Iceland and Spain have signaled their intention of referring the case to the 
International Court of Justice, and United Kingdom has hinted that the 
dispute could be resolved through adjudication.10 However, presently, 22 
years after Spain as the first contending state flagged its intention to seek 
adjudication, and 14 years after Iceland did the same, no state has 
referred the case to the court. Despite its legal character, there are no 
moves to settle the dispute by means advised by international law. This 
finding suggests that states indeed are political actors in an international 
anarchy, where legal steps toward a settlement either is in their disinterest 
or could be regarded as an encroachment on their sovereignty.11 
 
Moreover, the current diplomatic efforts by Norway primarily seek to 
ease political constraints and potential threats to peace and stabilit in the 
area rather than bringing about a negotiated settlement. These are efforts 
with a low degree of legalization.12 Even after decades of conflict, rather 
than seeking dispute settlement, Norway has initiated dialogues with 
partners and allies to gain some leverage in its exercise of jurisdiction in 
the disputed area. The government has sought «understanding» and 
                                                
10 Spain and the United Kingdom are not named in the Chapter 4. Diplomatic 
correspondence obtained on a later date show that Spain informed that it would refer 
the case to "competent international courts." Spain, diplomatic note Núm 56/18 to 
Norway 30 July 1986. The United Kingdom informed that its position had strong 
support in international law if the issue "were ever referred to the International Court 
of Justice." United Kingdom, diplomatic note to Norway 17 March 2006. 
11 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hand and Soft Law in International 
Governance," International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000). 
12 Abbott et al., "The Concept of Legalization." 





reassurances more than acknowledgement or accept from foreign powers 
for its policies in the Svalbard area. In these dialogues Norway has 
appealed to others’ interests, for instance linking its management of the 
resources off Svalbard to their respective needs for energy security, rather 
than persuading with legal arguments.  
 
These results demonstrate the shortcomings of traditional legal 
approaches to the Svalbard offshore issue. International law does not 
produce a settlement. It may mediate a settlement only if invoked by the 
states and consented to by the disputing parties. Arguably, despite the 
legal nature of the controversy, political factors appears as cardinal in the 
dynamics of dispute settlement, as has been suggested by realist scholars. 
As a result, the issue may endure as a political wrangle. 
 
 
Bowing to law 
 
The study reproduced as Chapter 5 demonstrated how international law 
could set new premises for international politics and how it constrains 
state behavior even beyond what was intended at the time of its creation. 
The study examined whether the process of determining outer limits for 
continental shelves beyond 200 nm could influence politics in the 
Svalbard offshore area, thus addressing the second research question of 
the dissertation. For decades foreign powers have disagreed over 
Norway’s right under the Law of the Sea Convention to establish 
maritime zones adjacent to the territorial sea of Svalbard, the rights of 
contracting parties to the Svalbard Treaty to exploit resources on equal 






entitlement to exercise coastal state jurisdiction in maritime areas outside 
Svalbard. Since some of these contentions have been poorly substantiated 
and may seem unwarranted by international law, Norway has been 
challenged even beyond what may be subscribed to differences in legal 
views and interpretation.13 
 
The study concluded that the delineation process, as established by the 
Convention and involving the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS), indeed alters the premises for politics toward 
the areas around Svalbard. The Commission is not a dispute settlement 
body, but the process calls upon all parties disputing the Norwegian claim 
to inform of any cases of «unresolved land and maritime disputes». In 
effect, the process is a call that urges parties to assert their objections 
before the Secretary-General of the United Nations if they have any. 
Failure to do so could equal to estoppel, and states would thereby be 
precluded from asserting objections at a later stage. 
 
Indeed, none of the states that have historically challenged Norway over 
the right to establish maritime zones and exercise coastal state 
jurisdiction outside the territorial sea of Svalbard seemed able to uphold 
their objections within the framework of the ongoing legal and technical 
process of determining the outer limits of the continental shelf.14 Their 
acquiescence to the Norwegian claim to zones around Svalbard could 
prevent them from pursuing their former positions at a later stage, both 
theoretically and practically. Hence, as the process affirms that Svalbard 
                                                
13 Chapter 7. 
14 An overview at the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm> 
accessed 10 April 2008. 





generates zones under the Convention and general international law, it 
also consolidates Norwegian jurisdiction over the area. Accordingly, the 
legal and technical process of determining shelf limits may constrain 
politics, setting a new standard for warranted claims in the maritime areas 
around Svalbard. 
 
This result is not merely a legal-technical argument, but has political 
consequences. Legal rules bring about political repositioning, even while 
national interests are constant. Amid the delineation process objectors to 
the Norwegian management of the maritime zones of Svalbard have not 
substantiated their earlier contentions in the legal terms of the Convention 
and general international law. Notably fisheries nations, with strong 
interests in maintaining access to maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard,15 
seem to have bowed to the dynamics of international law. Iceland, a 
persistent objector to the Norwegian views, ceased its repeated claim that 
areas beyond the territorial sea were outside the jurisdiction of any state. 
It acknowledged that Svalbard, as any other territory, could generate both 
an Exclusive Economic Zone as well as a continental shelf under the Law 
of the Sea.16 Spain abandoned its long-held position that the zones of 
Svalbard featured a regime equivalent to the high seas. A new position, 
conveyed in a reaction to the Norwegian submission to the CLCS, is 
arguably a reservation of rights of its nationals under the Svalbard Treaty 
rather than an objection to Norway’s right to zones and coastal state 
                                                
15 Notably, Iceland regards access to fishing grounds a "vital interest" to the nation. 
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, letter to the International Court of Justice, 
29 May 1972 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (UK v Iceland) [1972] Quoted from 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5749.pdf> accessed 28 March 2008.  
16 Iceland, Note to Norway, 11 July 2006. Also see Thomas Heidar, "The Svalbard 






jurisdiction.17 Even Russia in its reaction to Norway’s submission seemed 
to abandon earlier views, including assertions that the outer shelf limits 
were determined by coordinates named in Article 1 of the Svalbard 
Treaty rather than through the procedures of the Convention.18 Thus, the 
legal-technical process of determining limits seems to have contributed to 
reducing a complex international dispute, with plural positions reflecting 
diverging national interests, into a dispute with a clearer legal character. 
Accordingly, due to its increasingly legal-technical character, the issue is 
partly de-politicized. This finding correspond with the assertion made by 
Friedrich Kratochwil, who describes international rules as «a type of 
directive that simplify choice-situations by drawing attention to factors 
which an actor has to take into account».19 
 
 
The politics-law process 
 
The first process, addressing the interaction of politics and law, shows 
how legal dispute settlement procedures seem to carry little or no 
independent weight if not concurring with the national interests of the 
disputing actors, notwithstanding the highly legal character of the dispute. 
The study suggests that clashing political interests preclude a legal 
settlement. There is no evident normative «pull» toward a negotiated 
settlement or adjudication, even though it could end their long-standing 
differences in the legal interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty. Diplomatic 
                                                
17 Spain, Note Verbale to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 3 March 2007. 
Also see Spain, Note Verbale to Norway, 2 March 2007. 
18 Russia, Note no. 82 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 21 February 
2007. 
19 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; reprint, 1990). 





consultations, with an inferior degree of legalization, are preferred 
although they have no legal bindings. Viewed in isolation, this result 
suggests that international law interferes marginally with international 
politics.20 
 
However, the inference that international law therefore is a variable 
entirely dependent on political factors is not warranted. This dissertation 
also shows that international law does not fall into a one-way causal 
relation to international politics. Norway’s consolidation of hitherto 
contested right to, as well as coastal jurisdiction over, maritime areas 
around Svalbard cannot be derogated to political factors alone. It is also a 
product of law, where legal instruments become autonomous factors in 
the shaping of politics and thus the regime for the zones of Svalbard. 
International law has indeed effects that were not intended by its 
adaptors: The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, as well 
as detailed procedures for determining outer limits for the continental 
shelf, were established to prevent states from making excessive claims.21 
Hence, there is a discrepancy in the Svalbard case between the intended 
effect and the real effects of the procedures that cannot be accounted for 
by political variables alone. They have independent impacts on 
                                                
20 Chapter 2, with references to e.g. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, 7 ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006). James Leslie 
Brierly, The Outlook for International Law, vol. Scientia Verlag Aalen (1977; reprint, 
1945), Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1979), John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International 
Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-1995), Robert G. Gilpin, "The 
Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. 
Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), George W. 
Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News About 
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?," International Organization 50, no. 3 
(1996). 
21 Ted L. McDorman, "The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World," International Journal of Marine and 






international relations. The influence of legal rules in the disputed 
offshore areas outside Svalbard is at least partially autonomous, in the 
sense that international law is a political determinant.22 
 
In sum, the politics-law process has been addressed as an explanatory 
variable spurring conflict and providing order in the maritime areas 
adjacent to Svalbard. At the same time the process is suggested to be 
composed by two factors that are interdependent. While legal dispute 
settlement mechanisms are displaced in the political wrangle over rights, 
international law also shape state behavior. It is evident that, as Abbott et. 
al. put it, «legal and political considerations combine to influence 
behavior».23 International law is, as Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons argue 
for institutions, «both object of strategic choice and a constraint on 
actors’ behavior».24 Law is simultaneously cause and effect.25 It is on one 
hand «deeply embedded in politics: affected by political interests [and] 
power», as asserted by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, but at the 
same time, «law and legalization affect political processes and political 
outcomes. The relationship between law and politics is reciprocal».26 This 
                                                
22 Argument for international law thus runs parallel to those for regimes, as argued by 
e.g. Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983); for institutions, as argued by e.g. Lisa L. Martin and 
Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998); values, as depicted by e.g. Judith 
Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical 
Framework," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, 
ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Cornell University Press, 1993); and 
social norms, as argued by e.g. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; reprint, 1994). 
23 Abbott et al., "The Concept of Legalization," 419. 
24 Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International 
Institutions," 729. 
25 Ibid., 743. 
26 Judith Goldstein et al., "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics," 
International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000), 387. 





dissertation has provided empirical evidence for this theoretical assertion 
and disclosed some mechanisms through which this reciprocity works. 
 
 
8.3. International system and foreign policy 
 
Shaped by the system 
 
The study reproduced as Chapter 6 demonstrated that Norway in the 
maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard is constrained by the international 
system, featuring the international controversy over its sovereign 
entitlements. Addressing the third research question of the dissertation, 
the study set out testing an hypothesis that the exercise of Norwegian 
authority – expressed through policy statements, legislation, law 
enforcement and prosecution – is insensitive to the contending policies of 
foreign powers toward the area. It rejected the hypothesis and found that 
external factors indeed constrain behavior in multiple ways, causing 
modifications in the behavior of both political and non-political domestic 
actors, in different phases of the exercise of national authority, from 
legislation to enforcement and prosecution.  
 
First it found the non-legislative policies of Norwegian authorities to be 
constrained by the international system. The Norwegian government and 
parliament see the debate over Norway’s jurisdiction around Svalbard as 
one of their main foreign policy challenges, prescribing diligent 
diplomatic efforts to ease the constraints. Norway views the interests and 






«maneuvering room», a metaphor adopted by Foreign Minister Jonas 
Gahr Støre.27  
 
Also national legislation reflects that Norway’s rights in the maritime 
zones adjacent to Svalbard are contended. For instance, Norway chose to 
establish a non-discriminatory 200 nm Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) 
around Svalbard rather than a full Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
primarily done to avoid confrontations with foreign powers.28 Its self-
imposed moratorium on petroleum activity in the northern Barents Sea is 
also partly due to the international controversy over rights offshore 
Svalbard.29   
 
Moving beyond governmental policies, the paper also found non-political 
actors to be constrained by external factors. Law enforcement by the 
Norwegian Coast Guard in the 200 nm zone is exercised leniently as a 
response to the international controversy. In operation guidelines the 
Coast Guard has explicated that actions of law enforcement are taken at a 
higher thresholds in the FPZ around Svalbard than in the uncontested 
EEZ outside its mainland. Legal charges and arrests are more common 
reactions to violations in the uncontested zone than in the Svalbard zone. 
 
The Norwegian public prosecution also admits that it has been cautious in 
incidents that have involved foreign vessels operating in contested 
Svalbard waters. The Director of Public Prosecution confirmed a «culture 
                                                
27 Jonas Gahr Støre, "Et hav av muligheter – En ansvarlig politikk for nordområdene," 
Tromsø 10 November 2005.  
28 See for instance, Knut Frydenlund, Lille land – hva nå? Refleksjoner om Norges 
utenrikspoliske situasjon (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982) 
29 Jan Petersen and Jonas Gahr Støre, personal communication (interviews), 15 April 
2005 and 1 December 2006, respectively. 





of caution» after one episode in the 200 nm zone involving a Russian 
trawler that escaped arrest in 2005, and stated that decisions should not be 
made in a political vacuum. Foreign policy considerations «may weigh 
heavily», he confirmed, which is also reflected in historical decisions. For 
instance, the public prosecutors issued in 1998 a nolle prosequi and 
discontinued prosecutions against a Russian vessel that was being 
apprehended from the fisheries protection zone, an episode that had set 
off hectic diplomatic activity. 
 
The Norwegian sensitivity to external factors in its management of the 
Svalbard offshore area reflects that Norway is a small state with limited 
capabilities to handle clashes with foreign powers, not least by military 
means. The finding corresponds with the realist notion of states relating 
to each other in an anarchic system, where the system and its structure 
pose constraints on policy behavior.30 
 
 
Shaping the system 
 
The study reproduced as Chapter 7 explored the causes for policy change 
in the maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard. It demonstrated how the 
policies of Norway affected its own «maneuvering room», and in doing 
so, the study relates directly to the fourth and last research question of the 
dissertation. The study found that the acts of Norway to a large extent 
provided the occasions or opportunities for others not only to express but 
also to shape and develop their foreign policies. In effect, small-state 
                                                






Norway, intended or not, influences the international system – the system 
it in turn is constrained by.  
 
Assessing the diplomatic history of the Svalbard offshore dispute, the 
paper found that foreign policies toward the area have been shaped and 
conveyed in bursts and epochs. Examining these epochs, the study found 
that foreign policies conflicting with Norwegian policies often have been 
shaped on the back of actions by Norway. Repeatedly, changes in 
Norwegian legislation and enforcement practices occasioned other states 
to assess and reassess their interests in the maritime areas adjacent to 
Svalbard. For instance, contending positions were shaped after Norway 
passed new legislation applicable to the zones amid developments in the 
law of the sea in the 1970s and informed foreign powers of this in 
diplomatic communication. This occasioned new policies toward the area 
of states such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Also, as the 
Norwegian Coast Guard adopted new enforcement measures in the 
fisheries protection zone in 1986 and 1994, new policies were assumed 
by states such as Spain and Iceland.  
 
Most strikingly, perhaps, diplomatic initiatives by Norway to win 
endorsement have prompted foreign powers to consider their interests in 
the area, paradoxically often resulting in the opposite of support, i.e., 
reservations and objections. The first wave of reservations followed the 
diplomatic consultations in which Norway drew attention to the Svalbard 
area. This in turn led to a National Security Decision Memorandum by 
the United States National Security Council in 1976, as well as to the 
reservations of the USA, the United Kingdom, West Germany and 
France. Likewise, in the mid-1980s Norway approached the United 





Kingdom to discuss any differences in legal views on Svalbard. The 
diplomatic efforts gave the British «a chance to explore the issue» anew, 
as a British official puts it.31 A revised and more confrontational British 
policy followed the Norwegian initiative. Furthermore, a series of 
diplomatic consultations labeled nordområdedialogene, initiated by 
Norway and commenced in 2005, have had a similar unintended effect. It 
provided an occasion for other treaty parties to see political opportunities 
in the maritime areas outside Svalbard. The flaws of the Norwegian 
diplomatic initiative culminated in a multinational session on the 
Svalbard issue in London in 2006, a session to which Norway was not 
invited.32 
 
Norway’s influence on its systemic conditions is evident. The positions of 
foreign powers challenging the Norwegian view are not proactive 
expressions of ad infinitum interests, but are often shaped in the 
interaction of states, i.e., in the international system. As noted in Chapter 
2, several scholars have indeed pointed to the reactive nature of foreign 
policymaking.33 Attention is recognized as a bottleneck in organizational 
behavior,34 but also a precondition for policy change. Attention, provided 
by both diplomatic efforts and new jurisdictional acts in the Svalbard 
                                                
31 David Anderson, personal communication (interview), 25 January 2007. 
32 UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, personal communication (letter 0124-07), 6 
March 2006. 
33 K. J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 6 ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1992), Jeffrey S. Peake, "Presidential Agenda 
Setting in Foreign Policy," Political Research Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2001), Lydia 
Andrade and Garry Young, "Presidential Agenda Setting: Influences on the Emphasis 
of Foreign Policy," Political Research Quarterly 49, no. 3 (1996), B. Dan Wood and 
Jeffrey S. Peake, "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting," The American 
Political Science Review 92, no. 1 (1998). 
34 Mutatis mutandis, Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-







offshore case, repeatedly created what Johan Olsen describes as a «choice 
opportunity»,35 and K. J. Holsti depicts as a foreign policy «occasion».36 
Such opportunities and occasions have in turn resulted in new policies 
toward the Svalbard area.  
 
 
The system-policy process 
 
The actions of a state and the interaction of states may be troublesome to 
keep separate, as demonstrated by theses studies. Only for analytical 
purposes should system or policy be regarded a primitive unit. The 
international system is not independent of foreign policy, just as foreign 
policy is not independent of the international system. As Wendt points 
out, the system and its entities are co-determined or mutually constituted 
entities.37 When the system was regarded the independent variable of the 
analysis, as implied by the third research question, it became evident that 
the policies of Norway were constrained by it. In line with the 
fundamental structural realist notion of state behavior, the system (and its 
structure) powerfully influences behavior.38 The finding dismissed any 
foreign policy analysis based exclusively on domestic factors, since the 
study implies that heeds of international peace and stability weigh 
                                                
35 Johan P. Olsen, "Public Policy-Making and Theories of Organizational Choice," 
Scandinavian Political Studies 7 (1972). 
36 Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 273-74. 
37 For instance, Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International 
Relations Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 339. Also see ———
, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992); ———, "Constructing International 
Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995); Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-
Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 36, 
no. 3 (1992). 
38 Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 318. Also see Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 122. 





heavily, not only in policymaking, but in the whole exercise of contested 
Norwegian rights in the maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard. 
 
As the research question was turned around, addressing the policies of 
Norway as the independent variable, it became evident that the 
international system was altered by actions of Norway. Even while the 
structure of the system has been relatively stable, the behavior of small-
state Norway has altered the policies of others. Relatively modest 
changes in Norway’s legislation or enforcement practices in the areas 
outside Svalbard could cause substantial shifts in the views and positions 
of other states. Also Norwegian diplomatic efforts, intended to ease 
policy differences, could have undesirable systemic effects. This finding 
reflects the notion that governments often are reactive rather than 
proactive,39 and supports earlier studies suggesting policy agendas to be 
largely determined by external events.40   
 
In combination, the two causal links make up a system–policy process 
that is paradoxical: Norway has by its exercise of rights and diplomatic 
efforts nourished systemic conditions it in turn is constrained by. On one 
hand, even while the structure of the system has been relatively stable, 
small-state Norway has repeatedly spurred major shifts in the policies of 
others toward Svalbard. By occasioning for and causing other states to 
revise their policies toward the Svalbard offshore area, Norway by its 
actions has altered its case-specific systemic conditions. On the other 
hand, the system has causal effects on the policies of Norway by defining 
                                                
39 Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 273. 
40 Wood and Peake, "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting.", Peake, 
"Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy.", Andrade and Young, "Presidential 






the «maneuvering room» of Norway.41 Foreign policies contending 
Norway’s claimed rights represent a latent threat to Norwegian interests 
as well as peace and stability in the area, since actions by Norway may 
lead to international repercussions. Norwegian authorities are thus 
restrained in the exercise of Norway’s contested rights in the areas 
outside Svalbard. Ironically Norwegian diplomatic efforts to ease its 
systemic conditions may indirectly constrain Norway’s opportunity to 
exercise is claimed sovereign rights in the zones adjacent to the 
archipelago. 
 
In sum, while most previous studies of the system-policy processes – 
notably the agent-structure debate – have been highly abstract, attending 
to meta-ontological and epistemological issues,42 this dissertation has 
made an empirical contribution to the field. It has substantiated the 
assertion that the international system and foreign policy are co-
determined entities. Moreover, it has explored some case-specific 




8.4. Concluding remarks 
 
This dissertation has made an empirical contribution to the general 
understanding of causal connections between international politics and 
law, as well as between the international system and each state’s foreign 
                                                
41 Term consolidated in Jonas Gahr Støre, "Et hav av muligheter: En ansvarlig 
politikk for nordområdene," Tromsø 10 November 2005. 
42 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 26. 





policies. It has also made a case-specific contribution to the 
understanding of how order and conflict are induced to the maritime areas 
adjacent to the Svalbard archipelago. As for the latter, two observations 
will be elaborated on in these concluding remarks. These are observations 
that are reinforced by both the politics-law and the system-policy 
processes. The first observation points to the attention cost, referring to 
how attention to the Svalbard issue may preclude a further consolidation 
of Norwegian offshore rights. The second is the binary pull, i.e., the draw 
toward a more lucid dispute over rights in these maritime areas, where 





By «attention cost» this dissertation refers to the negative implications 
that international attention has to an orderly and peaceful regime in the 
maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard. From a Norwegian perspective, 
attention cost appears in both the politics-law and the system-policy 
processes. As for the former process, a general lack of attention to 
conflicting interests in the Svalbard offshore area has enabled small-state 
Norway to provide for a national and arguably orderly regime,43 despite 
objections from powerful states, even from those with overwhelming 
nuclear capabilities. Arguably, more attention would have been coupled 
with more conflict. The orderly influence that legal rules for shelf 
delineation have on Svalbard politics has also been explained in terms of 
attention: As noted by Kratochwil, rules simplify choice-situations by 
                                                
43 Geir Hønneland, Barentsbrytninger: Norsk Nordområdepolitikk etter Den kalde 
krigen (Kristiansand S.: Høyskoleforlaget, 2005), Alf Håkon Hoel, "Det folkerettslige 






directing attention to certain factors rather than others. Law affects 
political processes partly by channeling attention. Demonstrated in this 
dissertation, the legal procedures for determining the outer limits for the 
continental shelf is directing international attention away from disputes 
over Norway’s right to establish maritime zones around Svalbard, since 
the delineation process underway for the continental shelf preconditions 
that Norway has such right. Amid the determination of the northern limits 
for the Norwegian shelf, states including Russia, Spain and Iceland seem 
to have discontinued their explicit objections to Norway’s right to 
establish maritime zones beyond the territorial sea of Svalbard. Arguably, 
the objections have faded due to the economy of attention. In any event, 
order in the maritime zones adjacent to Svalbard – based on Norwegian 
jurisdiction – has been most effectively maintained and promoted in the 
shadow of international attention.  
 
As has been demonstrated, attention is not merely a function of some 
permanent national interests. Lack of attention does not necessarily imply 
a lack of potential interest. Interests can also be sequels to attention. The 
dissertation has proved that states are as much reactive as they are 
proactive, and that national interests are identified and assessed following 
attention, sparked by events. When attention is attracted to one issue, 
interests in it may arise. 
 
Norwegian claimed rights in the Svalbard area are most effectively 
consolidated when little international attention is paid to the issue. Since 
other states’ policies toward the maritime areas adjacent to Svalbard are 
reassessed and sharpened during periods of increased level of awareness, 
as explained by the system-policy process, it is rarely in the interest of 





Norway to attract unnecessary attention. While a firmer exercise of 
national jurisdiction in the areas outside Svalbard may be required to 
fortify Norway’s claimed sovereign rights, diplomatic efforts are not. 
Norway’s latest strategy of putting the High North on the international 
agenda, also by initiating the bilateral consultations known as 
nordområdedialogene, has thus proven to be ineffective, at worst 
counterproductive. Parallel, over the Svalbard territory Norway has 
cemented its sovereignty through incremental policies since the 1970s 
and is today virtually uncontested.44 
 
 
The binary pull 
 
The last observation regards the pull toward an increasingly bipolar 
conflict over rights in the maritime zones adjacent to Svalbard. While the 
international debates hitherto have involved multiple actors expressing a 
myriad of views concerning the right to establish maritime zones, the 
right to exercise jurisdiction in Svalbard waters and the application of the 
Svalbard Treaty to the offshore areas, the complexity is coming to an end. 
Legal views are becoming more refined and are approaching two distinct 
camps: In practice, the Norwegian and the British. Both the politics-law 
and the system-policy processes pull toward a more clear-cut split in 
positions. 
 
Firstly, as the politics–law process suggests, legal rules for determining 
the outer limits for the continental shelf are causing repositioning among 
                                                






those states contending Norway’s claim to zones around Svalbard.45 
While dodging adjudication on the issue, they are directed away from 
positions suggesting that Norway is not entitled to zones by the 
procedures established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. It becomes impossible to uphold former positions since the 
process of determining limits in fact preconditions that Norway may 
establish maritime zones beyond the territorial sea of Svalbard. 
Moreover, by acquiescence to the delineation process, they acknowledge 
Norwegian jurisdiction over these zones. The remaining question is 
whether the rights and obligations provided by the Svalbard Treaty are 
applicable to the zones. Hence their positions are likely to be guided 
toward the British position, which suggests that the Svalbard Treaty 
indeed applies to the 200 nm zone as well as the continental shelf 
adjacent to the archipelago. If legal rules indeed have the effects as have 
been suggested by this dissertation, international differences will in the 
future be regarding the application of the Svalbard Treaty to the maritime 
zones beyond the territorial sea, and not revoke Norway’s right and 
obligation to exercise jurisdiction in the areas.  
 
Secondly, this binary pull is reinforced by the system–policy process. As 
noted, Norway has sought to increase the international attention to the 
Svalbard offshore issue through the nordområdedialogene. An increased 
attention level has in turn spurred more coordination among the states 
that oppose Norway’s views. As a response to the Norwegian diplomatic 
endeavors, states have increasingly exchanged and discussed their legal 
                                                
45 Among those are positions expressed by Russia (the Soviet Union), Spain, Iceland 
and the European Commission DG Fisheries. Historically, also Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia have questioned Norway’s entitlement to establish zones. See 
Chapter 7. 





views. As already noted, the United Kingdom gathered a number of 
contracting parties to the Svalbard Treaty in London in 2006 to discuss 
their positions. With a more coordinated opposition, Norway may face a 
more uniform contention. Again the coordinated position seems to 
address the application of the Svalbard Treaty provisions to offshore 
areas rather than challenging Norway’s right as coastal state to exercise 




The causes of conflict and order in the maritime areas adjacent to 
Svalbard are complex. This dissertation has explored some determinative 
processes that affect the area, notably the interplay of international 
politics and law, and the exchanges between the international system and 
foreign policy. It has sought to add new empirical as well as theoretical 
insight to the issue: At stake is not only a sustainable management of 
natural resources in a sensitive and delicate Arctic ecosystem, but also the 
safety and wellbeing of the peoples of the High North. As the race for 
natural resources in the region picks up, understanding the causes for 
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Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea: Executive Summary, 2006. 
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APPENDIX V. ABREVIATIONS 
 
 
ASW   Antisubmarine Warfare 
CLCS   Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
CSCE   Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
DG   Directorate-General (of the European Commission) 
EC   European Commission 
EEZ   Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU   European Union 
FPZ   Fisheries Protection Zone 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
ILM   International Legal Materials 
LNTS   League of Nations Treaty Series 
LOS   Law of the Sea 
LOSC   Law of the Sea Convention 
MAGE  Marine Arctic Geological Expedition 
mil.   nautical mile 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
nm   nautical mile 
PCIJ   Permanent Court of International Justice 
UN   United Nations 
UNCLOS  United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
UNTS   United Nations Treaty Series 
USGS   United States Geological Survey 
 
 
 
